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The aim of this thesis was to examine racism in order to participate in the
development of anti-racist strategies. For this reason it investigated two central
features of racism - the philosophical and the political. In connection with the
philosophical feature it examined racism in relation to the constitution of identity. In
particular, it focused on the way identity is hound to the relationship between self and
'other'. In connection with the political feature, it explored racism as a defence of a
system from which advantage is derived on the basis of culture. In order to pursue
different aspects of that defence they were examined in relation to the 'Pauline
Hanson Controversy' in Australia.
Anti-racist movements often fail to keep pace with changes in racist ideologies
and practice. This can have serious consequences during the current time of
globalisation, especially as racist ideologies seem to he shifting from biological to
cultural principles. A key area within anti-racist strategies in Australia has been the
essentialist and social constructivist debates. A central question within these debates
has concerned the representation of Aboriginal identity. This is because notions of
fluid subjectivities can challenge racisms based on fixed notions of identity; however,
in this instance it could undermine the possibility of campaign. In an attempt to
explore the impasse between the essentialists and social constructivists, my thesis
examines notions of identity and difference. In particular, it focuses on Jacques
Derrida's device of differ (a)nce, Edmund Husserl's strategy for reducing prejudice,
and Martin Heidegger's notion of authenticity. In order to focus on the cultural
aspect of racism, this thesis examines issues related to the 'United Nations Draft
Declaration On the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' in connection with Fukuyama 's
essay about the 'End of History'. A fter evaluating the philosophical and political
aspects of racism, I will claim that there are certain aspects of Edmund Husserl's
work, which could challenge essentialist based racist ideologies in such a way that
does not undermine the possibility of campaign.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to examine the cognitive and political features of
racism. In connection with the former, it will explore racism in relation to notions
concerning identity and difference - the delineation of self-identity and other. This
approach is based on a working definition that the constitution of self-identity is
somehow bound to the relationship between self and other and vice versa, and how
racism manifests in the relationship between self and other. The political feature of
racism will be explored within a working definition that racism is a defence of a
system where advantage is derived on the basis of different races. Theories about
racism, in terms of individual prejudices, have a tendency to suggest that collective
racism is an aggregate of individual attitudes. This notion presupposes that the whole
is not greater than the sum of its parts. It is a kind of atomistic view of racism. The
aim of this thesis is to investigate the phenomenon from a non-atomistic view. In so
doing, it will examine the state's role in the maintenance of racism. Therefore, as well
as exploring racism as the defence of a system from which advantage is derived on
the basis of race, it will also examine the system being defended.
While the aim of this work is to explore the cognitive and political features of
racism, the objective is to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies for
the twenty first century. This is a time when racial distinctions are being superseded
by cultural differences, and past forms of racism that were understood as the defence
of a system in which advantage was gained on the basis of race, are changing into
forms of racism that could be understood as the defence of a system in which
advantage is gained on the basis of culture.
As the aim of this thesis is to examine racism, and the objective is to
participate in the development of anti-racist strategies for the contemporary world, an
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examination of identity within the framework of globalisation will be required. There
has been much speculation about the meaning of globalisation. Some understand it as
an intense and accelerated extension of modernism, and others argue that it is
producing new forms of political, economic, social and cultural life (Held, 1991;
Gordon, 1988; Jameson, 1991; King. 1991). Some argue that it is driven by a single
factor such as capitalism (Wallerstein, 1991), technology (Rosenau, 1990), or politics
(Gilpin. 1987). Others argue that it is multidimensional (Giddens, 1990; Robertson,
1991). Some scholars are concerned with changes in space and time within
globalisation (Giddens. 1991; Harvey, 1989). According to Harvey (1989),
globalisation has altered the representations, which play a part in the constitution of
cultural or national identities. It has done this by altering the notions of time and
space, which are the basic coordinates in any form of representation (Harvey, 1989:
240). As the process of globalisation seems to be having an affect on identity it will
also be considered within the context of contemporary racism.
The words 'race' and 'racism' have been referred to above but there seems to
be no consensus as to their meanings. Ideas about race and racism have changed
throughout history and it has been argued that contemporary understandings of race
and racism stem from the Enlightenment period. This is because the Enlightenment's
quest for a single scientifically organized system needed to define man's place in
nature. As this was also a time of European expansion and conquest other races had to
be placed within this system. It has been argued that European expansion and trade
played an important role in influencing ideas about other races (Curtin 1965: 34-39).
It has also been suggested that the Enlightenment thought saw the emergence of
articulated ideas about racial diversity, and the difference between the cultural and
intellectual attributes of different groups (Mosse 1985: 1-16). According to others, the
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attribution of superiority to some racial groups was a crucial element in the
development of racial thinking in the nineteenth century (Horsman 1981: 116-135). It
has also been argued that Gobineau's ideas about racial degeneration through
miscegenation, and his view of the origin of differences between races, proved to be
an integral element of later racial thinkers in a number of countries including
Germany (Biddiss 1966:256-269).
The historical shifts in the concept of race have been traced from its
emergence in European languages in the late fourteenth century, and it has been
argued that the early racial emphases on decent in terms of origin, lineage, breed, or
stock shifted after the eighteenth century towards racial distinctions based on
geography, climate, and social conditions. This shifted the emphases from notions of
pedigree towards varieties, types, subspecies, or group identities (Banton, 1988: ix-
xii; 11; 167-169). Evolutionary theories also gave a fluidity to the earlier taxonomic
categories based on origins, because races only diverge from each other in their
relative gene frequencies. With the growing emphases on Darwinian theories those
groups also became known as breeding populations.
Social Darwinism, a variant of the theory of biological evolution, had an
enormous impact within the twentieth century because it emphasises "the struggle for
existence" and "survival of the fittest" (Proctor, 1988:10-38). However, these ideas,
which preceded the publication of the Origin of Species (Darwin, 1859), led towards
the possibility of planned eugenics within one species, whereas Darwin emphasized
the opportunistic nature of random mutations, which led to speciazation. In other
words, while Darwin's theory was non-teleological, Social Darwinism was goal
orientated. For example in Germany in 1904, Alfred Ploetz founded the Journal of
Racial and Social Biology in order to investigate "the principles of the optimal
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conditions tor the maintenance and development of the race." And in 1905 he and E.
Rudin founded the Society for Racial Hygiene}
Theories about race have changed over time but they have also been
transformed into a means for nation-states to achieve their goals of domination,
exploitation and extermination of racial difference. For example, the racial hygiene
movement was not initially directly connected to the idea of Aryan supremacy, but the
right wing of it eventually became incorporated into the Nazi medical apparatus. In
Nazi Germany the social problems concerning race, gender, crime, health,
unemployment and poverty were turned into medical problems; Medical problems,
which drove the public health programmes, that led to the Holocaust (Proctor,
2 • • • •1988:10-38). And Social Darwinism also provided a pseudo-biological justification
for the White Australian Policy during the early twentieth century (Anderson, 1997:
31).
The issue of identity is a central component of anti-racist strategies as well as
racist ideologies. In both Nazi Germany and Colonial Australia the identification of
the 'other' were based on a belief in natural or innate differences. Anti-racist
strategies have criticised this form of essentialism arguing that identities are socially
constructed. Others have argued that these socially constructed identities can form a
base on which to fight against racism. These different approaches have led to debates
between the essentialist and social constructivist . While notions of fluid subjectivities,
compatible with globalised notions of space and time, can challenge racisms based on
1 Initially there were 32 members, which grew to over 1.300 by 1930. with the effect that by 1932
racial hygiene was taught in twenty-six separate courses in most German universities. Additionally, it
should be noted that most of the leading journals concerned with racial hygiene were established before
the rise of National Socialism (Proctor. 1988: 10-38).
2 Racial hygiene was not unique to Nazi Germany as eugenics flourished in England, America and
elsewhere. For example, in 1914 eugenics was taught in 44 American colleges and universities and by
1928 the number had grown to 376. In addition racial hygiene was taught in nearly three-quarters of all
American colleges and universities (Proctor. 1988: 400).
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the fixed notions of identity, the possibility of campaigning can be compromised by
the deconstruction of the category. In an attempt to participate in the development of
anti-racist strategies my thesis will explore this impasse.
During the early 1990"s in Australia, a significant debate emerged within
Aboriginal studies and anthropology. It was about the concerns expressed by white
scholars that the Aboriginal emphases on blood lines were damaging to the Aboriginal
fight for social justice. According to this argument, biological essentialism could only
lead to racial hierarchies and new forms of racism (Hollinsworth, 1992:137-155);
(Mudrooroo, 1992: 156-158); (Castles, 1996:10); (James, 1993: 207-221). This
argument against biological essentialism was later taken up into the political arena as
a criticism against reverse-racism.
On the September 10, 1996, Pauline Hanson, the independent member for
Oxley in Queensland, delivered her maiden speech to the Australian Federal
Parliament. 3 During this speech she declared that her previous comment, "that
Aboriginals received more benefits than non-Aboriginals," won her the seat in Oxley
but also resulted in her being called a racist. Against this charge of racism, Hanson
argued that she wanted equality for all Australians, and that the present government
was encouraging separatism by reverse discrimination, and that it was doing so on the
racial basis that the Aboriginals were disadvantaged. Hanson, on the other hand, did
"not believe that the colour of one's skin determines whether you are disadvantaged,"'
and argued that racial emphases should be rejected and that the government should
address the social issues. Issues relating to unemployment, immigration and
multiculturalism, were some of the ones she listed. She argued that the immigration,
which was directly and indirectly lengthening the dole queues, was leading to
3 From http://www.theaustralian.coin. a U /extras/Q12/hanson4.htm. The following quotes are taken from
the same speech.
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discontent, and that multiculturalism was preventing the assimilation required for a
strong and united nation. For example.
A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united. The world is
tull of failed and tragic examples, ranging from Ireland to Bosnia to
Africa and, closer to home, Papua New Guinea. America and Great
Britain are currently paying the price.
On June 2, 1998, a few days prior to the Queensland state election, Pauline Hanson
addressed the parliament. This speech, 4 which also included her criticism of
multiculturalism. was mainly concerned with the possible 2004 signing of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.' According to Hanson this
would lead to further racial inequalities within Australia. She argued that "to survive
in peace and harmony, united and strong, we must have one people, one nation, one
flag."
Hanson's argument against state policies based on biological essentialism is
not inconsistent with scholars who have criticised it in connection with past forms of
state racism. For example, the racial policies of the Nazi Reich between 1933 and
1945 have been criticised because they elevated the purification of the Aryan race into
a first objective of official policy (Burleigh and Wippermann. 1991: 44-65). The
Afrikaner Nationalists were criticised because they imposed a system of racial
separation upon the country, including a legal definition of the four racial groups
(white, coloured, Indian, and African), which were the basis of the racial system
4 Appropriation Bill (No. 1) fromhttp://www.theaustralian .com .aU/extra /Q 12/hanson.htm.
5 In 1982, a 'Working Group of Indigenous Populations' (WGIP) was established. In 1993, it
completed its work on a 'Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' to be adopted by the
UN General Assembly. The Draft Declaration was the result of the work of representatives of
indigenous peoples and governments from all parts of the world. In 1995, the 'Commission of Human
Rights' established its own working group to examine the Draft Declaration. When this commission
finishes its work the Declaration will be submitted to the UN General Assembly for final adoption. The
Draft comprises 45 Articles divided into 9 parts covering. Fundamental Rights; Life and Security;
Culture, Religion and Language; Education, Media and Employment; Participation and Development;




created. The US Federal government has been criticised for its role in the
maintenance of segregated race relations (King, 1995: 205-210). And the earlier
•White Australian Policy' has been criticised (Castles and Vasta, 1996: 1-11).
Some theorists have criticised the British political scene for how thinking on
anti-racism has become heavily influenced by essentialist forms of political and
cultural discourse, that naturalize and dehistoricize racial difference (Gilroy, 1990:
192-209). On the other hand, Adam and Moodley argue in favour of utilizing
identities based on race in post-apartheid South Africa (Adam and Moodley, 1993:
104-116). In America. Marcus Garvey has argued for the need for black people to
develop a sense of pride and identity of themselves as a 'race" (Garvey, 1987: 314-
318). Along similar lines Tony Martin has argued in favour of converting the
disabilities of race into a positive tool of liberation (Martin, 1976: 23-33). Ture and
Hamilton have also argued for people in America to redraw the boundaries of black
political identity under the banner of 'black power" (Ture and Hamilton, 1992: 34-
56); and Foucault has pointed out the advantages of reverse discourse as a strategy
(Foucault, 1978: 101). These arguments reflect the relationship between resistance
and oppression in the construction of identities, and there have also been a number of
papers looking at the construction of Aboriginal identities (James, 1993; Hinkson,
1997). However, the difference between Aboriginal Australians and non-Aboriginal
Australians, which is at the heart of Hanson's argument and the focus of this thesis, is
the difference between different understanding of land ownership - Western liberal
democracy and Aboriginal.
There's an old Aboriginal saying that 'we don't own the land, the land
owns us', said Pauline. We think of ourselves as custodians of the land,
and the land's not just soil and rock to us. It's the whole of creation - all
the land, water, and air, and the life everywhere, people, too. All these
things are related and linked together in the dreamtime. So you see,
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Aboriginals are part of the land and it is part of them. When we lose our
land, we lose part of ourselves.
(Davidson, 1993: 10)
While a number of seholars have argued that Aboriginal identity has been
constructed and represented in connection with oppression and resistance, there is no
evidence to suggest that their understanding of land ownership was constructed after
colonization. In fact, the doctrine of terra nullius (land belonging to no one) meant
that the land was available to be appropriated by the colonizers without consent,
consultation or compensation to the original inhabitants (Poole, 2000: 10). It is this
difference in the understanding of land ownership, which marks the fundamental
difference between Aboriginal culture and Liberal Democracy.
The common law of aboriginal title, recognized by the highest court of the
land in Australia, Canada and New Zealand is based on the assumption
that aboriginal peoples have a distinctive relationship to the State based on
a unique set of entitlements. In this context the liberal nation-state, based
on interconnected principles of abstract citizenship, indivisible
sovereignty, and the pre-eminence of individual rights over any notion of
collective rights, is called into question.
(Ingram, 1997: 37)
By calling the liberal nation-state into question, the Aboriginal culture is
offering an alternative to Liberal Democracy within Australia. As an alternative this
places it in the position of the 'other'. Not the 'other" race but the 'other" culture.
However, it is the 'other" culture, which cannot be assimilated into the present
framework of multiculturalism within Australia, because the multiple cultures within
Australia are part of the liberal democratic framework.
A number of scholars have examined the incompatibility between Aboriginal
culture and the dominant political, economic and social systems within Australia.
Suggestions for reconciliation and compromises range from assimilation through too
bicultural citizenship or separatism (Young, 1990: Ch. 4; Kymlicka, 1995: 62-98;
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Reynolds, 1996). And while this is extremely interesting and valuable work it is not
the focus of the present thesis. The aim of this work is to examine the cognitive and
political features of racism in order to participate in the development of anti-racist
strategies during a time of globalisation.
Within the framework of globalisation, Fukuyama put forward a political and
philosophical argument, that the end of history has been reached because ideological
conflict is virtually at an end (Fukuyama, 1989: 3), where the underlying argument is
the Hegelian dialectical notion that history is moved by conflict. Fukuyama's ideas
received many criticisms (Himmelfarb, 1989:24-26) but in response to his critics
Fukuyama replied that he did not mean the end of all conflict such as religious groups,
Third World countries that remain outside the liberal world or individuals and groups
within the liberal world, who have not been fully absorbed. But these, according to
him, would not lead to a different system of ideas, which could supersede or replace
liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1989/90: 23-24). From a deconstructive perspective
Derrida has challenged Fukuyama by arguing that we are nowhere near the ideal of
liberal democracy because "never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and
other economic oppressions affected as many human beings in the history of the earth
and humanity" (Derrida, 1994: 64).
Against Fukuyama, this thesis suggests that the United Nations Draft
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People , which is due to be signed in 2004,
could be understood as representing an ideological contradiction within liberal
democracy itself, and therefore could prevent "the end of history", as Fukuyama
understands the term. However, in order for this draft declaration to go forward the
indigenous people must take an essentialist stance. It is this essentialism that Hanson
is criticising. Her criticism also reveals a form of cultural racism by promoting the
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notion of an assimilated Australian national identity - a national identity that would
not be inconsistent with a liberal democratic globalised world. In order to examine
this torm ot cultural racism and to participate in the development of anti-racist
strategies, this thesis will focus on the work of three scholars - Jacques Derrida,
Martin Heidegger, and Edmund Husserl.
The writings of Derrida, Heidegger and Husserl were chosen for a number of
reasons. Husserl and Heidegger were chosen because both wrote before and during
the rise of National Socialism. While Heidegger's work was promoted, Husserl's was
denounced, partly because it promoted an ideal of universal rationality for all men,
which included Unmenchen such as Jews and Negroes. 6 This was a form of
rationality, which attempted to reduce prejudices. Against Husserl, Heidegger
developed an epistemology in which all meaning depends on the context and is
permanently anticipated from a particular horizon of intelligibility. The result of this
was a powerful critique directed against the ideal of objectivity within Husserl's
Phenomenology. The notion that all meaning depends on a particular context led to
the Hermeneutical Turn which laid the foundations for the essentialist / social
constructivist debates, which are the focus of this thesis.
In contrast to the atomistic notion of racism mentioned above, the issue of
identity is central to anti-racist strategies, which focus on the contexts whereby groups
and individuals construct and defend their identities. The former approach is related
the notion of a self, ego or subject which exists as an autonomous source of meaning
and agency. This notion stems from Descartes' Dualistic philosophy, which is
intrinsic to Liberalism and psychology. Derrida. Heidegger, and Husserl all criticize
this notion, and the following chapters will analyse their different approaches.
6 These references about Husserl were from the Nazi journal. NS-Frauenwarte 20 (1937/8), p. 625 and
were cited in Moran, D.Introduction to Phenomenology. Routledge, London: 2000. p. 88.
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In the first chapter the situation in Australia will be introduced and this will be
followed by an analysis of the work of Derrida, Heidegger and Husserl. In the
conclusion a claim is made, that the post-modern drive to eliminate all forms of
essentialism became another totalising grand narrative , which requires the
elimination of excess. It further suggests that there are certain aspects of Husserfs
work, which can accommodate the impasse in the debates between the essentialists
and social constructivists, which are at the heart of the anti-racist debates in Australia.
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CHAPTER ONE: FASCISM WITH A DIFFER(A)NCE
a. Hanson's Dreamtime
On June 2, 1998, a few days prior to the Queensland state election, Pauline
Hanson addressed the Australian parliament. 1 This speech was mainly concerned with
the possible 2004 signing of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples' which she argued would lead to further racial inequalities within
Australia. This was because inequalities stemming from The Racial Discrimination
Act of 1975, according to Hanson, left a loophole for positive discrimination for the
Aboriginals and therefore negative discrimination against other Australians. She
argued that all Australians should be treated equally with no one group of Australians
being given rights over another. Towards the end of the speech she said that,
we will abolish the office of Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander
Affairs, the indigenous advisory council and any other government
departments with a charter on race rather than individual need.
Hanson argued in favour of an equality based on individual needs and against
reverse racism. "We now have a situation where a type of reverse-racism is applied."
She argued that anyone who could claim some amount of Aboriginal blood had
economic advantages over other Australians who could not. According to Hanson,
being Australian should be based neither on race nor ancestry.
I am part English and part Irish, yet I do not claim to be English or Irish.
Yet I have more English and Irish blood in me than most who claim to be
Aboriginal have Aboriginal blood in them. Whatever we may have been,
it is Australians we must be.
An Australian identity, according to Hanson, is not connected to race or
ancestry but it is assimilation into a culture of "one people, one nation, one flag.
'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) from httpi/'/www.theaustralian.com.aii/extra/012/hanson.htin.
The following quotes are taken from the same speech.
2 See footnote 5 page 9.
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However, it could be argued that this absorption is not one, which is leaning in the
direction of the culture of Australia prior to the European colonization.
At some stage or another, every country in the world was held or owned
by someone else - in most cases by many different peoples at different
times. There is considerable evidence that even Australia experienced a
number of waves of occupation by different people. So you might
reasonably ask who were the first or perhaps what is the weight of
argument connected to being first. Does being first matter and therefore
does being first override equality for all of today's Australians?
It seems to be leaning towards the European culture of the colonizers. A Liberal
Democratic culture based on private ownership and the "modern understanding of
land ownership".
There is no true honest way of connecting Aboriginal hunter-gatherer
nomadic occupation with the modern understanding of land ownership,
nor should we try.
By identifying the contemporary and traditional Aboriginals understanding of land
with a hunter-gatherer nomadic occupation, she rejects the Aboriginal understanding
of land and calls the Aboriginal Dreamtime, which is embodied in Aboriginal culture
and connected to the contemporary land right debates, a nightmare.
These rural families and miners took land from no-one. They either have
paid for their land or are still paying for the land. No-one gave it to them.
They have rolled up their sleeves and worked hard to develop their land
and now face not the Dreamtime but the native title nightmare.
This argument is a form of reductionism. The advantage of reduction is that it can
cover up inconsistencies and oppositions by either absorbing one into the other or
dispensing with one in favour of the other. Hanson reduced the Aboriginal
understanding of land down to a hunter-gatherer economy because the Aboriginal
3The Dreamtime. which is understood as the mythological past, was the time when spirit ancestors
travelled throughout the land while giving it its physical form and also laying down the rules to be
followed by the Aboriginals. Knowledge about beings such as the Fertility Mother, the Great Rainbow
Snake and the Djanggawul Brothers and Sisters, were passed down the generations through verbal
stories, images, and ceremonies because the Aboriginals had no written documents. This lack of written
documentation is one of the problems connected to the current Land Rights issue, because prior to
colonization they had no concept of buying and selling land.
(The Native Title Act of 1993 became law on January 1, 1994).
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understanding cannot be assimilated or absorbed into the dominant political,
economic and social system of liberal democracy within Australia.
In an attempt to identify racism Caleb Rosado connected it to prejudice
arguing that ignorance and fear are at the heart of prejudice. According to him,
everyone is prejudice on some level through ignorance of the 'other" and they can be
fearful of loosing privilege and power to them. He outlined three levels on which
prejudice operates, the cognitive which involve stereotypes, the emotional that
involves positive and negative feelings that the 'other' arouses, and the behavioural
level where people engage in discriminatory and unequal treatment of 'others'. This
prejudice can then give rise to an ideology of negative attitude towards the 'other'.
The negative attitude can be based on biological differences, such as skin colour and
other physical features or cultural differences such as language, religion, or ethnicity.
However, according to him, racism is not about these differences but it is about power
and privilege. He distinguished three types of racism operating in society, which are
individual institutional , and cultural. Cultural racism is a combination of the other
two which become manifest as the expression of the superiority of one race's cultural
heritage over that of another race.
Thus, individual racism (based on the attitudes, behaviours, and self-
interests by which we have been socialized), is given a structural form
through the various institutions in society (such as the church, labour,
health, economics, education, politics, etc.), which in turn impacts our
cultural expression (our aesthetics, religion, philosophy, ideals, values,
needs and beliefs).
(Rosado, 1990: 7)
In an attempt to identify racism in Australia, Hollingsworth has argued that the
earlier nineteenth century racism towards Aboriginal Australians was usually violent
and brutal and expressed in terms of their complete inferiority. He further suggested
that the identity of racism as accusations of inferiority are relatively rare today, but
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that nowadays, it can be identified as a recognition that the 'others' are different and
need to be excluded as a threat to 'our' way of life. And, according to him, complaints
about "others' being privileged in some way have tended to replace the blatant
declarations of racial superiority of earlier times (Hollingsworth, 1988).
The earlier form of racism in Australia was based on Social Darwinism , which
provided a pseudo-biological justification for imperialism within colonial Australia.
During the early twentieth century the White Australian Policy seemed to oppose
established medical theory, as medical science of the late nineteenth century argued,
that a race of people were best suited to resistance of disease in their place of origin. It
was also argued that the health of Europeans would be affected in the tropical north of
Queensland. Richard Barry, a professor of anatomy at Melbourne University argued
that, the White Australian Policy was a medical problem of the first magnitude, which
required further scientific investigation. This type of argument eventually led to
Australia's first medical research institute, the Institute of Tropical Medicine in
Townsville, located in the tropical north of Queensland. Medical scientists there
gradually became less likely to relate tropical disease to the environment, and began
to argue that poor health was due to minute organisms and germs, which were located
on other humans. This meant that the local inhabitants were more likely to be blamed
for the European's bad health than the environment. At the 1920 Australian Medical
Conference W. A. Osborne, the professor of physiology at Melbourne declared that
white settlement was biologically possible, in the tropical north, so long as there were
no native population. The tropical races, therefore, went from being well adapted to
their environment, to being dangerously adapted to spreading tropical disease. And by
the 1920's the White Australian Policy was being advocated as a medical necessity
(Anderson, 1997: 31).
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Pauline Hanson's argument against multiculturalism and reverse discrimination
could be understood as an example of what Rosado and Hollingsworth identified as
cultural racism. Within her argument for an assimilated Australian society rather than
multiculturalism, Hanson listed Ireland, Bosnia, Africa, Papua New Guinea, America
and Great Britain, as failed examples of multiculturalism. However, she neglected to
list the failed examples of assimilated societies such as Nazi Germany and the earlier
version of assimilation in Australia, which was occurring at the same time as the
Holocaust. This was when many young Aborigines were pulled from tribal life by the
government's policy of assimilation, which included the practice of taking small
children from their parents and sending them off to boarding school. 4 Pauline Gordon,
the daughter of J.T. Patton who founded the first Aboriginal newspaper called Abo
Call , had the following to say about her earlier experience.
'They grabbed us kids, along with thousands of others all around
Australia. This was kept from the public mind,' said Pauline, talking faster
as she became more emotional. Til never forget the day I went away on
the steam train with my sisters. I was only eight, and I asked, 'What's
wrong with us, Mom? Why is it everyone is down on Abos? Why's it a
sin to be Aborigine?"
(Davidson, 1993: 3).
There were a number of changes to the situation of Aboriginal people during the
1960's. For example, this form of assimilation ceased to operate and in the 1967
referendum section 51, of the constitution, was changed to allow Australian
Aboriginals the right to vote. Despite these changes, however, all available social
indicators show that Aborigines are still highly disadvantaged with regards to health,
housing, education, employment, life expectancy and social conditions (Castles and
Vasta, 1996: 1-11). And while many government funded Aboriginal organizations
have been working towards addressing these health problems, the One Nation Party
4 For a discussion of this policy seeBringing Them Home: National Inquiry into the Separation oj
Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Children from their Families, Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission, Sydney, 1997.
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wants them abolished. As mentioned above, they want these problems addressed on
an individual basis rather than race. However, it has been argued, that the practical
solutions to areas such as health, housing, education and employment, offered by an
assimilated society, isolates the demands for improving living conditions from the
wider complexities of social and cultural well-being, and assimilation is "based on the
possibility of absorption and thus cultural genocide" (Hickson, 1997: 31).
Pauline Hanson is arguing for equality to be based on individual needs within a
"One People, One Nation, One Flag, Australia." It has already been pointed out that
the people within the One Nation would be treated individually but assimilated
towards a non-Aboriginal culture, however, which flag could Hanson possible have in
mind - the Union Jack (Figure 1) or the Aboriginal flag (Figure 2)? The Aboriginal
flag which was designed by Harold Thomas, an artist and an Aboriginal, in 1971, a
flag that is a symbol of the race and identity of the Aboriginal people. The colours of
the flag are black, which represents the Aboriginal people, red for the earth and their
spiritual relationship to the land, and yellow for the sun, the giver of life. On July 14,
1995 William Hayden, the Governor General of Australia, proclaimed the flag a Flag
of Australia under section 5 of the Flag Act 1953.
Figure 1 Figure 2
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PAULINE HANSON'S
Figure 3. Pauline Hanson at a One Nation party meeting.
Take a piece of cloth such as a handkerchief.
What is the function of a handkerchief? To
wipe off sweat, clean out hands, wipe our
mouth, blow our nose-all menial tasks. Is the
meaning of these functions in the cloth? No. It
is in the culture, in our human society, which
has taught us to view and regard a
handkerchief in this way. You can take the
same piece of cloth and make it into a shirt or
a blouse and give it the functions of both
protecting and celebrating our bodies. You can
also take this same piece of cloth, add some
red, some blue and some stars and turn it into
a flag, and it becomes the signature of a
people, symbolizing their group identity and
nationality (Rosado, 1990: 4).
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b. Neither alpha nor omega
The assimilation ol the Aboriginal people into the dominant political and
cultural system within Australia, could be understood in terms of globalisation.
Globalisation, like the eighteenth century Enlightenment, seems to be the
advancement ot Western values around the globe. Some scholars have argued that this
marks the end of the old world order and the beginning of a new one (Wallerstein,
1984; King, 1991). 'The End of The World", in one form or another, has been
pronounced on a number of occasions throughout history. These have ranged from
biblical eschatology through to the green movement (and the occasional prophecy
from speakers corner in London). Of particular importance to this thesis, however, is
Fukuyama's essay about the End of History (1989) and Derrida"s criticism of it
(1993).
In The End of History? (1989) Francis Fukuyama argued that "what we are
witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of
post-war history, but the end of history as such." The end point of mankind's
ideological evolution, and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the
final form of human government. According to Fukuyama "the triumph of the West,
of the Western ideal is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable alternatives
to Western liberalism" (Fukuyama, 1989: 3). He states elsewhere 5 that "the ideal of
liberal democracy can not be improved on" (Fukuyama, 1992: xi) and that we have
reached the "final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1989: 4), which he
described as an essential achievement of a classless society envisioned by Marx, "the
class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West" and "the root causes
of inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our
5 The 1992 book was written as a defence against the criticisms he received from his 1989 essay.
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society (Fukuyama, 1989:9). And he believes (contrary to Nietzsche) that the world
will be populated by the "last men" the "victorious slaves" who have given up art and
philosophy in a world where only economics really matters as all the grand
ideological claims are defunct (Fukuyama, 1992: 301). He further argued that
"consciousness is cause and not effect, and can develop autonomously from the
material world" (Fukuyama, 1989: 6).
Fukuyama's argument about history being at an end was from a Hegelian
perspective - a teleological. conflict based form of Idealism. However, unlike
Fukuyama, who believed that the struggle for freedom had been won by liberal
democracy and the market economy, Hegel argued that the struggle for freedom
travelled through the history of thought. According to Hegel, history is a rational
developing system moving towards absolute knowledge. He traced the development
or evolution of this rational developing system or consciousness within the
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).
Hegel did not believe that cognition was an instrument or a passive medium
for knowledge, but an active process whereby self-consciousness becomes conscious
of what the appearances hide. What the appearances hide is the negation of full self-
consciousness. Here he argued that the mind or spirit is compelled to move on and
search for true knowledge until it reaches absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge is
the final stage of determinate negation. Determinate negation is the realization that
knowledge gained is not true knowledge and the mind is compelled to move on and
supersede this form of consciousness until it reaches true knowledge, which is
knowledge of everything, and it is then no longer compelled to move on. In doing so,
the Absolute develops from the objective pole towards the subjective, in both abstract
and concrete form. On the concrete side, this development went from art to religion to
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philosophy (Hegel, 1977: 580-591). On the abstract side, he traced the development
ot freedom and reason from the ancient Orient through classical Antiquity and into
the Christian-Germanic epoch, which included Feudalism, Reformation,
Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.
The logic, driving force, or motor, which is pushing the developing
consciousness towards absolute knowledge, is called the Dialectic. The process of
development is a conflict between the opposites. The conflict is between what self-
consciousness the Absolute does have, or what it 'is', because it 'is' self-
consciousness, and what self-consciousness it does not have, or what it 'is not',
because what it 'is not' is something other that self-consciousness, because all it will
be will be self-consciousness. This means that what it 'is not' yet, is other parts of
itself that it does not as yet know about. In other words, it is something other than
Absolute self-consciousness.
Hegel further argued that anything short of full self-consciousness was only
partly true because only the whole was the truth. He understood reality itself to be the
fully developed notion, which the cognitive appearances partly hide and partly reveal
(Hegel, 1977: 47).
In this knowing, then. Spirit has concluded the movement in which it has
shaped itself, in so far as this shaping was burdened with the difference of
consciousness [i.e. of the latter from its object], a difference now
overcome. Spirit has won the pure element of its existence, the Notion.
(Hegel, 1977: 490)
Appearance are plural, incomplete, and in the process of development. A development
driven by the determinate negation (Hegel, 1977: 51), where by incomplete plural
identities sublimate into different forms until reality is no longer hidden. "The Truth is
the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself
through its development". (Hegel. 1977: 11)
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Marx and Engels criticized Hegel's Idealism by arguing that it is the way we
live which leads to what we think rather than what we think leading to the way we
live. "It is not the consciousness ot men that determines their existence", wrote Marx,
in the Preface to Critique of Political Economy "but, on the contrary, their social
existence determines their consciousness" (Sabine and Thorson, 1973: 698). And
unlike Hegel, who charted history as a progress in reason and freedom, they charted
the stages via the types of production. "The hand mill gives you society with the
feudal lord; the steam mill society with the industrial capitalists". (Cornforth, 1955:
7).
Marx argued that freedom was connected to the unfolding of human
potentialities as "the positive power to assert his true individuality." However, this
would not be possible under capitalism but would require communism (Oilman, 1976:
114-119). And the movement from capitalism to communism would be based on a
materialist dialectic whereby the contradictions that force the changes, are
contradictions within society rather than contradictions within understanding.
If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeois's is compelled, by
the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a
revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by
force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these
conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class
antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its
own supremacy as a class.
(Marx and Engels, 1967: 105).
Fukuyama argued that freedom and the classless society are part of the new
world order of liberal democracy but according to Marxists, exploitation is the basis
of capitalism. In emphasizing Hegel's notion of determinate negation with its clear
division between the thesis and anti-thesis, later Marxists of the Second International
believed that the dialectical contradiction between the exploiters and exploited would
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lead to change as an historical necessary outcome (Bernstein, 18^8).<> The Frankfurt
school, which attempted to adapt Marxist theories to the theoretical and political
needs tor an even later time, criticized this notion of evolutionary determinism on the
materialist pole and also criticized Hegel's evolution of reason and freedom on the
idealist pole. Against Hegel they argued that reason itself was impure and linked to
domination instead of freedom. Against the orthodox Marxists, they argued that the
identity and difference of the proletariat and bourgeoisie was not clear-cut and there
were many other complex variables involved.
According to Horkheimer, there are irreducible tensions existing in history with
a multiplicity of contradictions, which can be resolved in a multiplicity of different
ways (Held, 1980: 178). Horkheimer agreed with Hegel's notion of the dialectic
because it showed identity to be historically conditioned, incomplete, and requiring
continuous criticism and reconstruction, and thereby allowing space to enable a
critique of the givens within society. However, he disagreed with the notion that there
was a point for point relationship between the object and subjective knowledge that
would eventually unify. This was because there was an irreducible tension between
them. 7
Against the notion of pure reason, Horkheimer argued that history was not
unfolding towards a rationally organized and free society but was heading for a new
type of barbarism, a totalitarian system in which all individual autonomy would be
eliminated. According to Horkheimer, there are no underlying laws moving society
towards a more rational and reasonable existence because reason is not autonomous
but historically conditioned like desires, and reason is not united with freedom but is
6 Cited in D .Held.Introduction to Critical Theory. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. p. 18.
Members of the Frankfurt School rejected both sides of the tug of war between the Idealist identity
theory of Hegel and the Orthodox Materialist identity theory. They argued that the subject and object
could not unify at either pole - hence non-identity thinking was their aporia.
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united with domination. What is taken to be reasonable is unreasonable beeause it is
tied to certain material conditions and practices, which are not fully reflected in
human consciousness (Held, 1980: 24). And in the Eclipse of Reason (1974) he
argued that, even though there is an irreducible tension between the object and
subjective knowledge of it, the majority of people are no longer even striving for
some form of objectivity because reason is now predominantly instrumental. It is a
form of means-ends rationality that can no longer criticize and reconstruct the givens
because the gap between objective and subjective reason has collapsed.
Fukuyama's argument, based on the dialectic method, that history has ended
because Western liberal democracy has triumphed over communism, and by
implication over Marxism, was criticised by Derrida who attempted to resurrect a
non-dialectic Marx. Therefore. Derrida's deconstructive reading of Fukuyama's
argument was not just a criticism of the end of history, but also a criticism of the end
of Marxism. Derrida's version of Marxism, however, was a long way from the
Frankfurt School because he repudiated the notion of dialectics. He accepted
Heidegger's claim about "the end of philosophy"", which can be seen in his essay on
Levinas (Derrida, 1978: 79). And in Plato's Pharmacy he argued that it was the
instability of the meanings being communicated, which are presented as unambiguous
within dialectical reasoning, which makes that philosophy problematic (Kamuf, 1991:
115).
Derrida did not believe that meanings of words can be tied down, and he
criticised philosophers for attempting to strive for precision in the language in order to
communicate as though the meanings were unproblematic. According to him there
was a metaphysics of presence prevalent in Western philosophy since the time of
Plato. The metaphysics of presence is about the assumption that an identity or concept
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can be completely grasped. He argued that consciousness and philosophy are
constituted by language, and that the words used to communicate, from a
metaphysical viewpoint, were understood to be stable and pure. Derrida called the
assumptions behind the metaphysics of presence, a belief that words can communicate
unambiguous meanings, logocentricism. x. Like Heidegger Derrida was also interested
in the deconstruction of Western metaphysics, but unlike Heidegger, he did not
believe that there was an original meaning to be found. Unable to break completely
with metaphysical thought, Derrida used the language of reason to show up the
inadequacies of reason. He understood this as playing a double game and it can be
seen in works such as The Double Session (Kamuf, 1991: 171 -199) and Glas (1986).
Derrida developed Heidegger's notion of destruction but reworked it into the
notion of the deconstruction of texts (Rapaport, 1989). Derrida deconstructed various
texts to reveal the multiplicity of meanings, internal differences, repressed
contradictions, inconsistencies, inequalities and hierarchies of binary opposites, which
lead to the centring of one meaning and the marginalisation of the other. Derrida's
notion of textuality, which is about how a text means rather than what it means,
highlights and traces these preconceptions and prejudices behind the various
interpretations. He traced the preconceptions and prejudices, as they intersected and
diverged, as one would trace a main road, in an A to Z, as it by-passed the
interconnecting side streets.
. In Specters of Marx (1993 ) Derrida's main argument against Fukuyama seemed
to be the way Fukuyama sidestepped the discrepancy between the ideal and the real in
connection with liberal democracy. Against Fukuyama. who acknowledged the gap
but argued that the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved. Derrida
s He also called the belief that speech is closer to an original meaning in thought than writing,
pnonocentricism. A point that will be returned to when discussing the Land Rights issue.
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suggested that the gap is a result of a flaw in liberal democracy itself, "this failure and
gap also characterize, a priori and by definition, all democracies, including the oldest
and most stable ot so-called Western democracies" (Derrida, 1993: 64). Against
Fukuyama s argument about the triumph of liberal democracy, Derrida argued that it
was hanging by a thread "the tact that this triumph has never been so critical, fragile,
threatened, even in certain regards catastrophic, and in sum bereaved" (Derrida,
1993: 68).
Derrida was critical of the notion of 'end' in Fukuyama's argument because he
did not believe in the sudden breaks presupposed in ends or origins. "I do not believe
in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal 'epistemological break', as it is called today.
Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually,
interminably be undone" (Derrida, 1981: 24). In addition he extended this notion to
Marxism itself. According to Derrida Marxism cannot suddenly end because it will
only re-emerge as a ghost (Derrida, 1993: 107). And because Marxism cannot just
end it is also open to re-interpretation "there is more than one of them" (Derrida.
1993: 13).
Deconstruction. which is often attributed to Derrida, came under considerable
criticism after Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism was revealed. 1'
Karl Lowith may have began the first Heidegger controversy with The Political Implications of
Heidegger's Existentialism (1946). an essay which was criticized by Eric Weil and Alphons de
Waehlens in later issues of Les Temps Modernes. In Martin Heidegger: On The Publication Of The
Lectures Of 1935 Jurgen Habemias criticized Heidegger's philosophy for not including any
counterweights to either the individualistic egalitarianism against the notion of the natural privilege of
the stronger, nor the cosmopolitanism against the motif of the German people as history's chosen
people, nor a form of objectivity which could counter one-sided thought (Wolin. 1993: 196). In Back
To History: An Interview (1988) Pierre Bourdieu, in his criticism of Heidegger, argued against claims
concerning the autonomy of philosophy (Wolin, 1993: 264). And In Heidegger's Idea Of Truth (1984)
Ernst Tugendhat argued, that Heidegger's concept of truth as a clearing, which seeks to surpass
Husserl's. is an over generalization which extends truth to all uncovering and every disclosedness,
resulting in the loss of any difference (Wolin. 1993: 246).
Since the publication of Farias's Heidegger et le Nazism (1987) and Hugo Ott's (1985; 88) archival
work in Freiburg (Wolin: 275). the debates were stepped up by an enormous amount of work. This
work was not only devoted to Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, and attempts to discredit or
salvage his philosophy, but also the later work that developed out of it. For example, in Heidegger,
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Deconstruction is almost impossible to define, however, it could he roughly described
as a mission to hunt down phenomenological essences and binary oppositions. An
example of this can be seen in Derrida's Introduction (1962) to the Origin of
Geometry. This is not an introduction in the traditional sense but a deconstructive
reading of Husserl s Origin of Geometry (1936). It was an immanent critique, which
focused on the 'origin in relation to signs and writing and the nature of historicity. It
concentrated on ambiguities latent in HusserFs notions of ideal history, ideal origins,
and the concept of historical a priori. Derrida's Introduction can be understood as a
supplement to Husserfs text. A supplement because he supplements some of
Husserfs key notions with differ(a)nce. As he also uses supplement and differ(a)nce
as deconstructive devices in later works, this thesis will examine those devices before
proceeding with the Introduction.
Derrida used the notion of "supplement' in Of Grammatology (1976) where he
deconstructed Rousseau's use of the binary oppositions of speech and writing. Derrida
argued that Rousseau was logocentric because he understood writing as a supplement
Philosophy, Nazism (1997), Julian Young did by it, and that it was consistent with liberal democracy.
According to Wolin. in French Heidegger Wars , Derrida''s De /'esprit (Of Spirit. 1990) drew a
distinction between not deny the seriousness of Heidegger's politics, but argued that his philosophy
was not compromised Being and Time and the later work. In Heidegger & Derrida. Reflections on
Time and Language (1989), Herman Rapaport argued that Derrida's deconstruction was built on the
philosophical foundations laid by Heidegger. In Heidegger and Modernity (1990), Luc and Renaut
criticized Derrida for attempting to defend and salvage Heidegger and his philosophy. And in
criticizing Heidegger, they argued that his diagnosis of modernity, which was a criticism of technology,
consumerism and mass society, neglected democratic institutions and legal rights, and they accused
him of forgetfulness about the complexity of the modern society. And in The Heidegger Controversy,
Richard Wolin criticized Derrida's double standards in that his theories about authorship and non-
responsibility, which could be seen as an indirect defence of Heidegger's legacy to deconstruction,
were brought into question by Derrida's withdrawal of Philosophers' Hell: An Interview, from the
current edition. According to Wolin, Derrida feared that the aftermath of Farias's book would damage
the reputation of deconstruction. He also argued, that Derrida's deconstruction of binaries should not
extend to the opposition between Nazism and non-Nazism (Wolin, 1993: ix-xviii). According to
David Carroll, in the Forward to Lyotard's Heidegger and "the jews", the purpose of Farias's book
was to discredit Heidegger's philosophy, as well as philosophers influenced by it. He argued, that
Heidegger's philosophy was thoroughly fascist, and those who read it were 'either naively or
consciously perpetuating a very sophisticated and radical form of Nazism' (Lyotard. 1990: xvi).
However. Lyotard himself rejected any absolute correlation between Heideggerian and Nazism. In
Heidegger and "the jews" he warned against binaries such as making cut and dry judgments like, 'if
Heideggerian, then Nazi; if not Nazi, then [not] Heideggerian' (Lyotard. 1990: 51-53).
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to speech. According to Derrida supplement has two meanings in French, it means to
add something on to something that is already complete, and it means to add on
something to complete the thing. The word 'supplement" with these two meanings
taken together, destabilises both sides of the binary opposition. This de-centres the
hierarchy and its possible reversal. 10 'Supplement* is one of the devices in Derrida's
deconstructive arsenal - his strategy for overcoming logocentrism and the metaphysics
of presence. Some of the other devices he employs are trace, ecriture and differ(a)nce.
In addition to supplement Derrida also employed his device of differ(a)nce in
the Introduction. Differ(a)nce is understood as a non-concept because it can't be
defined in terms of oppositional predicates, it is neither "this nor that but rather this
and that" (Derrida. 1959).' 1 Derrida claimed that differ(a)nce is "neither a word nor a
concept -" (Derrida. 1982: 7) "but the possibility of conceptuality" (Derrida. 1982: 11).
Following Heidegger, he argued that Being and meaning could never coincide,
however, where as Heidegger understood difference to be temporal, and articulation
to be on the ontic level while discourse to be on the ontological level, Derrida argued
that there was a separation in time and identity. Differ(a)nce, according to Derrida.
was not a temporal difference between two identities nor an identity itself but both.
Derrida's notion of differ(a)nce is a difference with a difference as it included an
excess or trace.
Derrida agreed with Saussure. that the bond within the linguistic sign was
arbitrary, however, unlike Saussure he argued that the meaning of words couldn't be
tied down by the meanings of other words, because the meanings of those other words
are also unstable. The instability of those other words alters the meaning of each
10 This would be like preventing either side winning the tug of war. 1 will return to this point when
discussing reverse racism.
11 Cited in R. Kearney. Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1984, p. 110.
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word. (This is like when waves in the ocean can alter the relative position of boats to
each other and create a different pattern). Differ(a)nce could be understood as the
non-ground tor the conceptuality of the different patterns. According to Derrida, signs
point to things and this gives the illusion that the thing is present, but it is not, so the
sign stands for the thing's absence (rather than its presence), therefore, it represents
the thing's presence, in the thing's absence. It cannot represent it exactly because
these signs also have traces, which are the marks of something absent that have never
really been present either (Derrida, 1982: 15). And this allows for slippage of
meaning. Instead of tracing words back to their origin the word 'differ(a)nce', which
means both to differ and differ, shows how so-called opposites are joined by these
traces. This eliminates clear-cut divisions or binaries because the traces join up
meanings and contaminate each other, and this shows that neither is self-contained.
Derrida's notion of differ(a)nce destabilizes the more violent notion of
difference, as a way of presenting the other without the dialectical positive and
negative oppositions. In the Double Session (Kamuf 1991: 171-199) he argued that
philosophy as truth tried to exclude literature and poetry (with the more violent
difference). Derrida also used the device of'hymen' that joins and separates, between
Plato's philosophy and Mallarme's literature, to show that there is no absolute
difference but a differ(a)nce. Derrida also employed the word •pharmakon" in Plato's
Pharmacy (Kamuf, 1991: 112-139), in order to argue that one word can have different
meanings. When there are different meanings sometimes one becomes centred or
privileged at the expense of the other, however, the privileged meaning can leave
traces. This is because the privileged meaning has the marks on it from where it was
severed from the unprivileged meaning.
In the Introduction Derrida argued that Husserl's notion of origin supported a
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"metaphysics of presence . This is because his understanding of an origin was
something that was a present in the past. To be fully present, however, it must have
been severed trom its past and future, according to Derrida. This is because the notion
of a present makes no sense without the notion of a past and future, so the past and
future are traces within the present. This would mean that the present could not be
1")
identical with itself. " It follows from this that the eidetic reduction would also
contain traces of the tradition, and therefore, the origin that was located could not be
outside of the tradition.
Their historicity, then, is one of their eidetic components, and there is no
concrete historicity, which does not necessarily implicate in itself the
reference to an Erstmaligkeit.
(Derrida. 1989: 48)
Derrida supplemented the reduction, which travelled from the received tradition
back to the origin that gave rise to it, with differ(a)nce, to show that the reduction
could never make it back to the origin. This is because the origin could not be a
presence without limits. And limits have an effect on meanings that are related to
where they are limited, and they leave traces of those limits that omit something. This
means that the thing's presence leave traces of what's absent. And those traces of
I ->
absence are what metaphysics tries to hide, according to Derrida. ' They are the
omissions or exclusions within the text that should be thought about, because they
have effects on the understandings gained from the texts. And it is this non-presence
of the origin, which was lacking in the text and needed to be supplemented by
Derrida's Introduction. Not as a criticism of Husserl nor to add something that he left
out. but to show that there is always something missing necessarily (and by extension
12 ldentitv means that the thing is identical with itself. If the thing and itself are identical then the
identity is self-contained.
13 It would be like rubbing out all the side streets on the A to Z and just leave the main road. It could
also be like rubbing out all the excess pencil marks on a sketch, in order to leave a clean looking
drawing with defined boarders.
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this could be applied to the gap or aporia, between the ideal of liberal democracy and
liberal democracy which Fukuyama tried to cover up)
No identity or meaning or origin or intention or idea or book or anything is fully
present, according to Derrida, because to believe that something could be fully
captured or identified is to believe it to be self-contained or identical with itself -a
fixed, static identity. In other words, what is can never be presented and the
deconstruction of what has been presented, points to this necessary defect. In order
to present an origin it would have to be severed from things that it was connected to,
and traces of these absent severed things are mixed in with the presentation. This
means that in a return journey to the origin, the destination would not be the origin
itself.
More abstractly, then, an Origin, an absolute Origin, must be a differant
Origin - the never-yet-always-already-there as the 'beyond" or 'before*
that makes all sense possible.
(Derrida. 1989: 18)
According to Derrida, there can be no reactivation because the return inquiry begins
with this side of the tradition of that origin, which includes the traces of the absence,
and is therefore not a static origin but a differ(a)nt origin. In other words, we can
never get to reality (present or past) because we re-weave it as we go along
interpreting it.
Here, the 'in which it must have appeared' clearly reveals Husserl's
intention and sums up the sense of every reduction. This 'must' (have
appeared) marks the necessity now recognized and timelessly assigned to
a past fact of an eidetic pre-scription and of an apriori norm. I can state
this value of necessity independently of all factual cognition. Moreover,
this is a double necessity : it is that of a Quod and a Quomodo, a necessity
of having had a historical origin and of having had such an origin, such a
sense of origin. But an irreducible historicity is recognized in that this
"must' is announced only after the fact of the event. I could not define the
necessary sense and the necessity of the origin before geometry was in
fact born and before it had in fact been given to me. Absolutely free with
respect to what it governs, the lawfulness of sense is nothing in itself.
(Derrida. 1989: 49)
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However, when Husserl wrote that geometry "must have had an origin", he was
implying that no circles, straight lines, triangles or squares etc. existed in the natural
landscape. This meant that someone had to abstract the ideal from nature. It is this
individual act of abstracting, of thinking philosophically and obtaining an idea, that
Husserl was referring to. He was referring to it because he wanted to examine how
that individual idea can became understood as an objective fact within the
intersubjectivity of collective geometers. In addition, he wanted to reveal the
subjectivity mixed in with that objectively understood idea, in order to argue that that
objectively understood idea was not pure, but was a subjective abstraction from the
landscape. In other words, where Derrida focused on the 'origin" and was concerned
with traces within the tradition this side of the origin. Husserl was concerned with
traces (sedimentations) within the science of geometry. And the return inquiry
through the tradition as a form of critical thought, would be to see how so-called
objective facts within the discipline of geometry had changed. In addition, this would
give an example of how other ideals such as "pure arithmetic" and "ideal laws",
which are understood as the objective reference point within the intersubjectivity. are
• 14
all subjectively contaminated constructions.
for a genuine history of philosophy, a genuine history of the particular
sciences, is nothing other than the tracing of the historical meaning-
structures given in the present.
(Derrida. 1989: 175)
Husserl himself recognized the notion of a "now* to be an abstraction. 1^ and he
did not even posit the origin as a present, but as a past unknowable act of abstraction
from the landscape. This is why he emphasized that "there must have been an origin".
14 This will be discussed below.
15 This will be discussed below.
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Referring to Husserl's criticism of psychologism," 1 which was that it omitted the
subjective elements ot its own objective method, then this present work could be
understood as an example of why he believed it was important to study the
subjectivity within objective sciences.
It is evident in advance that this new sort of construction will be a product
arising out of an idealizing, spiritual act. one of'pure' thinking, which has
its materials in the designated general Pre-givens of this factual humanity
and human surrounding world and creates 'ideal objects" out of them.
(Derrida, 1989: 179)
Derrida's deconstruction was an attempt to examine interpretative methods,
which usually rest on shaky grounds. It was also to call unexamined assumptions into
question. He did this by drawing out facts of linguistic instability and demonstrating
that there are gaps that render value judgements a little suspect. However, Husserl
already knew this, because his notion of re-activation was a way to criticise received
truth claims. HusserPs Origin was part of his later work that was concerned with the
philosophy of history. He argued that history should be examined
phenomenologically, and this would involve a dynamic as well as the static
description of intentionality. The Origin presupposed the static description of the
origin of an idea, and contained the dynamic description of its genesis and evolution.
He pointed out that within the evolution of meanings, sedimentations are passed on
uncritically. The reactivation was intended to criticize those sediments.
In his Introduction Derrida argued that HusserPs notion of intentionality was
traditionality (Derrida. 1989: 150). He criticized Husserl for privileging normalcy by
privileging normal adults, scientific language and spatiality, while excluding children,
the mad. poetic language and movement (Derrida, 1989: 80). However, within the
context that Derrida is referring to. Husserl presupposed that it is the so-called normal
16 This will be discussed below.
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that has their ideas inserted into the we-horizon (intersubjectivity). What Husserl was
attempting to analyse was. how some abstraction from the landscape can enter that
we-horizon of intersubjectivity (culturally accepted objective facts) from an
intrasubjectivity, and then not only be understood but also understood as purely
objective.
This being presupposed, the primly establishing geometer can obviously
also express his internal structure. But the question arises again : How
does the latter, in its 'ideality', thereby become objective? To be sure,
something psychic which can be understood by others [nachverstehbar]
and is communicable, as something psychic belonging to this man. is eo
ipso objective, just as he himself, as concrete man. is experienceable and
nameable by everyone as a real thing in the world of things in general.
People can agree about such things, can make common verifiable
assertions on the basis of common experience, etc. But how does the
intrapsychically constituted structure arrive at an intersubjective being of
its own as an ideal object that, as 'geometrical" 1, is anything but a real
psychic object, even though it has arisen psychically?
(Derrida. 1989: 162-163)
Derrida also criticized Husserl's movement from intrasubjectivity to
intersubjectivity, by arguing that he inserted an ahistorical subjective idea into history
for the leap to objective ideality (Derrida, 1989: 141). However, Husserl himself
recognized this because it was the main point of his argument. He was arguing against
the notion of'pure' within the sciences, because 'pure' would involve no subjectivity
at all. He also argued against the notion of a 'pure ego" or self-contained identity.
According to Husserl, there was an unstable subjectivity underlying all the so-called
exact sciences. Returning briefly to the tug of war between subjectivity and
objectivity, if something is completely subjective then it is devoid ot objectivity. It
something is completely objective, then it is devoid of subjectivity. If there is some
relationship between the knower and the known then it can be neither completely
subjective nor completely objective. Husserl was examining intersubjectivity and
intrasubjectivity, by asking how a group of people could agree on the existence of
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something (in this case geometry but it could be extended to include Santa clause or
morality) and come to perceive it as though it existed in the objective world. (Do
numbers exist in the mind or in the objective world?) This brings in the notion of
cultural significance because it is the culture or community (in this case scientific)
that passes the information down through the generations. At each stop along the way
more things are added and some are eliminated from the body of knowledge, which
rests on previous knowledge that is taken to be objective. Husserl argued that this so-
called objective knowledge was constructed in a particular cultural framework and
therefore was not "pure'.
Derrida supplemented Husserfs notion of transcendental subjectivity by
arguing that "writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which
every present subject can be absent," (Derrida, 1989: 88) and this means that a
subjectless transcendental field is a condition of transcendental subjectivity. Derrida
argued that Husserl had to unbracket history, culture and language to allow for
intrasubjectivity. However, Husserl was criticizing these within his argument about
the "seduction of language victims" (Derrida, 1989: 165), which was a criticism of
the passive acceptance of the given discursive reality. Husserl was also arguing that
sciences, which claim exactitude, presuppose invariants that the reductions could test
because "every establishment of historical fact which lays claim to non-conditional
objectivity presupposes an invariant or absolute a priori" (Derrida, 1989: 179). This
was not just for geometry but all the sciences because he asked, "how does
geometrical ideality, just like that of all sciences proceed from its primary
intrapersonal origin" (Derrida. 1989: 161). And this means that the logic of these so-
called invariants should be able to be traced back by "beginning with the primal self-
evidences. the original genuiness must propagate itself through the chain of logical
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inferences, no matter how long it is" (Derrida, 1989: 168). He was not arguing that
they would reduce to an origin, so much as arguing that they present themselves as
though they can - as though they are built on rock rather than sand.
As truth claims becomes more believed they seem to become more objective.
The reason Husserl used geometry as an example, could be because it is easier to
reactivate the idea of a circle than it is to reactivate ideal notions such as democracy,
freedom. or equality. It also shows how something like an idea in the discipline of
geometry can seem so exact and objective, and he also seems to point to (without
spelling it out) the possibility that other ideals have more flexibility. The text
abounds with statements about geometry followed by a comment relating it to other
areas. For example,
Our results based on principles are of a generality that extends over all the
so-called deductive sciences and even indicates similar problems and
investigations for all sciences. For all of them have the mobility of
sedimented traditions that are worked upon, again and again, by an
activity of producing new structures of meaning and handing them down.
(Derrida, 1989: 171)
As science builds on knowledge it actually thrives on its sedimentations.
Sedimented knowledge is not always verified by people who build on what they
receive, prior to passing it down through the tradition. Husserl was examining how
geometry could change over time but retain the same identity. He argued that the
various stages could be judged by social beings themselves, through reactivation,
instead of comparing them with other idealities within the same cultural framework,
where they may reveal consistency or contradiction. This is similar to Foucault's
notion of "statements'.
a statement always defines itself by establishing a specific link with
something else that lies on the same level as itself: that is, something else,




Likewise. Derrida's notion of differ(a)nce has a great deal of currency as a anti-
racist strategy, when racism is based on binary opposites and phenomenological
essences. However, when racism is based on fluid identities such as in Australia, then
Derrida's device has a number of limitations. Even though it has limitations as a anti-
racist strategy it still has currency within the contemporary understanding of
discursive reality. It is limited as a strategy because it deconstructs the category of
Aboriginal, which is required within the land rights debates. It is also limited because
it undermines the Aboriginal strategy of reading the pastoral leases with fixed
meaning. This situation reinforces the notion that the politics of identity should not be
abstracted from the material context. That is why the aim of this thesis was to
investigate both the philosophical and the political aspects of racism. The next chapter
will examine the work of Heidegger, who emphasised the role of context within
meaning, in order to explore the possibility of overcoming the limitations of Derrida's




a. The 'self in self-determination
It The United Nut ions Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
People is signed in 2004, it will give the Aboriginal people the Right of Self-
determination. In order to diseuss the meaning of 'self-determination' this chapter
will examine the work of Martin Heidegger who, in Being and Time (1927),
developed an epistemology according to which all meaning is context dependent and
permanently anticipated from a particular framework, horizon, perspective or
background of intelligibility. The result of this was a powerful critique directed
against the ideal of objectivity - all meaning now depends on a particular
interpretative context. This Hermeneutical Turn , which was one of the major events
that took place in the contemporary philosophical scene, indirectly laid the
foundations for the essentialist/social constructivist debates that are the focus of the
present thesis.
According to Heidegger, truth as perfect unconcealment is impossible because
Dasein's understanding is profoundly historical. He argued that there is an ontological
difference between human existence, as existential characteristics and possibilities
which are unique, and its being thrown into existence at a certain time. The
uniqueness, according to him. transcends the historical language and thought which it
is thrown into, and which attempts to describe it. He further argued that when the
unique aspect of Dasein is repressed or forgotten, by its emergence within the
historical description of the 'One', then Dasein's existence could be inauthentic, but
that this inauthentic existence can be turned into an authentic existence. The notions
of authentic and inauthentic existences are both connected to Dasein as a being-in-the-
world. however, they are understood as different types of existence. In both cases
Dasein has no choice with regards to the other Daseins in the community that it is
thrown into, the time in history, the tradition, nor the culture, but it can exist in
different ways within them.
There are three different ways of existing as a being-in-the-world. which
Heidegger referred to as undifferentiated, inauthentic and authentic.
Dasein is an entity, which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to
any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition, which makes
authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one
or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated.
(Heidegger. 1962: 78)
An undifferentiated existence would be when Dasein did not recognize its throwness
or question the meaning of its own life. An inauthentic existence would be if it did
question its thrownness. In this state it may realize that the 'One' prescribes the
possible options for existence and it may feel anxiety. "Anxiety is anxious about
naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into unsettledness. It brings one back
to the pure 'that-is-it' of one's ownmost individualized throwness". Anxiety appears
when it realizes that it will die and return to nothingness. At this point it can do either
of two things. Instead of dealing with the anxiety, which comes from the possibility
of nothingness, it can refuse to recognize the situation and return to the inauthentic
state by falling in with the public and falling away from itself. The second option
would be to face up to death and the nothing. Become a being-towards-death.
Only Being-free for death gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes
existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's
existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of
possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one - those of
comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly - and brings Dasein
into the simplicity of its fate. This is how we designate Dasein's
primordial historicizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which
Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it
has inherited and yet has chosen.
(Heidegger. 1962: 435)
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The realisation of Dasein's own finitude is what gives it some form of
individuation and authentieity, heeause its relations to other Dasein's become
loosened. This is because Dasein is a Unite totality, which exists between birth and
death. Death is not understood as something that happens at the far end of a long life,
but a part ol Dasein itself. Part of its make-up. Death is the only part of its makeup
that it did not inherit from the tradition. 1 Death as a lid on Dasein's total existence
cannot itself be experienced" but its realization allows Dasein to become responsible
for its own lite. Dasein can choose the best possibility within a world that was
prescribed by the 'One* during its finite existence. It can project itself into the world
and make the most of its own possibilities within the givens. While this realization of
its own finitude theoretically or ontologically enables Dasein some form of
individuality, Heidegger also examined the practical or ontic side of authenticity.
"The fact that an authentic potentiality-for-Bcing-a-whole is ontologically possible for
Dasein. signifies nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical potentiality-for-Being
has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself' (Heidegger, 1962: 311).
The anticipation of death, discussed in his first chapter of the second division,
was understood as the ontological basis for authenticity. In the second chapter
Heidegger discussed conscience as the ontic base. The conscience is what brings
Dasein away from the 'One' and back to itself. It is understood as a calling but unlike
many other theories about the conscious, Heidegger's is neither mediated nor does it
have any content. It is simply a call to Dasein from itself. Heidegger did not agree
with or disagree with the other theories but explored the ontological or existential
foundations of the phenomena that they referred to. He investigated what it was that
made those experiences possible.
1 However, if immortality was achieved (through spare parts cloning or technology) then authenticity
would he impossible.
2 Death or nothingness is the aporia. the missing bit that is generative.
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The call ot conscious was understood as a type of reflexivity of the self with
itselt in an unmediated fashion, which calls Dasein away from the 'One'. In so doing
it breaks through the chatter, novelty, ambiguity and curiosity of the 'One" to call
Dasein back to itself. "Conscience summons Dasein's self from its lostness in the
'they"" While the caller and listener are both Dasein and not a third party they are
also not identical. This is because the hearer is lost in the "One" but the caller is not.
"The call comes from me and yet from beyond me." The call is silent but in its
silence signifies a sense of guilt. The sense of guilt is connected to the not-yet of
Dasein's possibilities. The guilt is related to the debt to oneself. The debt of the not-
yet that Dasein can take responsibility for, instead of giving it up to the 'One". In
short, the call of conscience calls Dasein "to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being",
which is the debt that it owes to itself, but it does not tell it what to do with the not-yet
part of its finite existence.
In many ways the forgetfulness of the question of Being and the need for its
repeat, mirrors the two divisions of Being and Time, the first describing the
inauthentic base, the second describing the transfer to authenticity. It also mirrors the
inauthentic and authentic poles of Dasein. The former forgotten or repressed by the
'One', the latter repeating or calling it back to its potentiality-for-Being. And this split
is also mirrored within the book calling philosophy back from its metaphysical
repression, a book written by Heidegger from the authentic side to the other
inauthentic readers.
According to Stephen Mulhall (1996), Heidegger wrote Being, and Time as an
attempt to call philosophy itself back from its inauthentic state to authenticity. As a
philosopher who had achieved some level of authenticity he wanted to pass this on to
his readers. Presumably he planned to call his readers out of the state of
44
inauthenticity, even though he argued that the call of conscience does not come from
some one else. In claiming to have written a fundamental ontology he presented
himself as someone who had achieved the state of authenticity in accordance with the
method itself. Mulhall argued that there was an apparent inconsistency here between
Heidegger's philosophical inauthentic/authentic analysis and its practical applicable.
If Being and Time was understood as a fundamental ontology which Heidegger
alone formulated, it would seem that he attained an authentic philosophical stance
unaided by a third party. However, as a self-generated authentic author of Being and
Time , in an attempt to call his readers out of their state of inauthenticity, Heidegger
put himself forward as a third party. A move that is actually inconsistent with his
method. According to Heidegger's method the call from inauthenticity to authenticity
is based on an inherent split. It is an empty call pointing to the not-yet on this side of
finitude. He made it quite clear that the call did not come from a third party, "the call
undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world"
(Heidegger, 1962: 320). However, if Heidegger the philosopher did not attain his state
of authenticity alone, but as a student of Husserl, this third party may have influenced
him, then not only would it be inconsistent with his method, but his generative aporia
could have been the absent Husserl - rather than death.
b. The 'Other' in self-determination
It has been argued that Heidegger gave Husserl's Logical Investigations a
privileged position, but that the reasons for this remains obscure within his writings
while his lectures reveal a link. According to Taminiaux. Heidegger discovered a
positive ground for his Being and Time in the sixth investigation of the Logical
Investigations. In My way to Phenomenology Heidegger mentions that Husserl
touched on the question of Being when he discussed the difference between sensuous
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and categorical intuitions (Taminiaux, 1990: 96-100). This is where Heidegger
seemed to link Being with the excess connected to the categorical intuition.
When I myself began to practice phenomenological seeing, teaching and
studying at Husserfs side, experimenting at the same time with a new
understanding of Aristotle in seminars, my interest began to be drawn
again to the Logical Investigations, and especially to the sixth
[Investigation] in the first edition. The difference between sensuous and
categorical intuitions, worked out in that Investigation, revealed to me its
importance for the determination of the 'manifold meaning of Being".
(Taminiaux, 1990: 98)
According to Husserl, meaning functions as a form which exceeds the content of pure
perception within language and sensations, and this excess is what grounds the given
even though it is mixed in with the givens. The excess together with the thing
identifies and confirms it in its identity, by joining sensuous intuition to categorical
intuition. (Taminiax, 1990: 102-106). Heidegger seemed to interpret this notion of
excess as Being.
Husserl's tour de force consisted precisely in this presencing of Being
[inasmuch as it is beyond the being of beings] made phenomenally present
in the category. By means of this tour de force, I was finally in possession
of a ground: Being is no mere concept, a pure abstraction obtained thanks
to the work of deduction.
(Taminiax, 1990: 108).
Heidegger also acknowledged the influence of Husserfs preliminary work of
phenomenology in his Logical Investigations , towards the end of section seven and in
footnote (v), but argued that phenomenology is about possibility rather than the
actuality, which is associated with metaphysics.
The following investigation would have been possible if the ground had
not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logische
Untersuchungen phenomenology first emerged.
(Heidegger, 1962: 62-63).
Heidegger argued that Husserfs notion of intentionality pre-supposed a more
primary intentional relationship, being-in-the-world, which does not rely on mental
activity (Heidegger. 1962: 87; 157: 275). His main argument against Husserfs
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method seemed to hinge on an interpretation of Husserl's distinction between the
ideal' and the 'real', which pre-supposed and relied on a separation between an
intentional content that is mental, and an objective world.
The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its
own sphere and is...encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which
misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves
are.
(Heidegger, 1982: 62-64)
He argued elsewhere, that comportment or a being-in-the-world was more
fundamental than Husserl's intentionality.
As ontic transcendence, the later is itself only possible on the basis of
originary transcendence, on the basis of being-in-the-world. This primal
transcendence makes possible every intentional relation to beings.
(Heidegger, 1984: 135).
And He has referred to examples such as doorknobs to argue that being-in-the-world
was prior to contemplating about it.
for the kind of Being which belongs to such concernful dealings is not one
into which we need to put ourselves first. This is the way in which
everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the
latch. The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we
encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies.
(Heidegger, 1962: 96)
Heidegger also criticized Husserl's method in section 44 of Being and Time.
This is where he discussed his notion of truth as opposed to the correspondence
theory of truth. Section 44 was made up of an introduction followed by three main
sub-sections. In the introduction Heidegger argued that a change took place in the
notion of truth, from Parmenides identity of truth and Being found in Fragment 5, to
the traditional concept of truth as a correspondence which stems from Aristotle's
Metaphysics. He argued that if truth is understood to be connected to Being, as
Parmenides suggests, then it also might need to be analysed within the area of
fundamental ontology, which is about the Being of beings.
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If, however, truth rightfully has a primordial connection with Being, then
the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the problematic of
fundamental ontology.
(Heidegger, 1962: 256)
In sub-section (a) Heidegger discussed three ways in which truth has traditionally
been defined as correspondence, and argued that Aristotle's definition of truth is
connected to judgment and correspondence.
Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment
as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of 'truth' as
'agreement'.
(Heidegger, 1962: 257)
The notion of correspondence or agreement pre-supposes two thing which are related.
For example, a mind and object or assertion and reality. This was meant to be in
contrast to Husserl's Logical Investigations vol. 2 part 2 where evidence and truth
were examined (Heidegger, 1962: note xxxiv, 493). According to Heidegger, if the
two things are ontologically distinct then there can't be a correspondence between
them. "What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object."
(Heidegger, 1962: 261). But according to him, truth as an uncovering, which requires
Dasein as a being-in-the-world, is more basic than a correspondence. And later on at
the end of the section he argued that "all truth is relative to Dasein's Being."
In sub-section (b) Heidegger looked in more detail at the notion of truth as an
uncovering. This is a concept of truth as aletheia, a Greek word meaning "uncovering
from a concealment." Heidegger then argued that this notion is the basis or original
notion, which the correspondence notion grew out of. "In proposing our definition of
truth we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordial"
(Heidegger, 1962: 262). He then argued that this more basic form of truth is
connected to Dasein's disclosedness as a Being-in-the-world. As a Being-in-the-
world, Dasein can be authentic and inauthentic in its understanding of itself and of its
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understanding of others. This means that its own disclosedness and concealment of its
own Being has an effect on the truth and untruth of his understanding of the Being of
other beings. When Dasein uncovers the truth of another Being it can communicate
this in an assertion, however, this assertion or correspondence is built on the
foundation of the uncovering.
Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities - a
Being which itself uncovers - has become truth as agreement between
things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have
pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional
conception of truth.
(Heidegger, 1962: 268)
In the second division of Being and Time , the meaning of Being was understood
to be the horizon or temporalization required for comportment between past, present
and future, which made the understanding of Being possible. An understanding,
which made the comportment to other beings possible. Against the traditional
ontologies, which presupposed a distinction between the subject and object and
understood truth to be ahistorical, Heidegger argued that Dasein as a being-in-the-
world was not a being which could be in possession of a world or along side of it.
"There is no such thing as the "side-by-side-ness" of an entity called "Dasein" with
another entity called "world"' (Heidegger, 1962: 81).
In The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking Heidegger also criticized
Husserl's reductions and appeal for an ultimate source of evidence within the world.
"Husserl's method is supposed to bring the matter of philosophy to its ultimate
originary givenness, and that means to its own presence'" (Heidegger. 1993: 440). He
rejected Husserl's reductions (except for the scientific one) because as Dasein is its
thrownness, then they cannot be reduced from it. Perfect truth as unconcealment is
impossible because Dasein's understanding is profoundly historical. However, it was
pointed out above that Husserl argued that the only apodictic evidence was that there
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was no apodictic evidence. This was because the ego has an open horizon and can't
have apodictic evidence for its memory or the future. And he has argued elsewhere
that a search for an essence does not necessarily mean that it could ever be attained.
We do not give up Descartes" guiding goal of an absolute foundation for
knowledge. At the beginning, however, to presuppose even the possibility
of that goal would be prejudice. (Husserl, 1975: 5)
Heidegger's later work revolved around his replacement of Husserl's notion of
signification as intentionality with the Being of language. In one of his essays, The
Way to Language, Heidegger attempted to experience the Being of language instead
of making assertions about language. He argued that the earlier notion of language as
a kinship between language as a showing and what it shows, was transformed into a
conventional relationship between the sign and its signified, which reflects the
transformation of truth from aletheia to representation. "The alteration of the sign -
from that which shows to that which designates - is based on a transformation in the
essence of truth" (Heidegger, 1993: 401-2) And according to him, this form of
linguistic studies does not show the Being of language.
He argued that the essence of language is in the saying, which unfolds as
pointing, but not signs, because the signs arise from the showing. (This is similar to
his argument that the essence of technology is not the technology itself but the
understanding of Being that gave rise to it. It is also similar to the understanding of
Being which gives rise to the notions of truth and representation). The showing,
according to Heidegger, is not just human because the thing letting itself be shown
precedes it. "We not only speak language, we speak from out of it" (Heidegger, 1993:
411). And in listening we can hear language speaking. Language is what speaks
through the saying or showing of what is spoken. As beings-in-the-world we can only
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understand the speaking and hearing of the Being of language within the historical
setting. "We hear it only because we belong to it."
Heidegger argued that the possibility of catching a glimpse of the essence of
language, instead ol representing language, we need to let ourselves be guided by it
along its own movement (Heidegger, 1993: 419). His notion of propriation, which is
the telling ot language, reveals and withdraws different modes of speech. However,
this propriation is currently being distorted as the language of Enframing, which
orders what is present. And this current distortion, which results from the
metaphysical understanding of Being, turns speech into information and formalizes
language.
The Being of language is not solitary because it needs humans to speak it.
Humans are part of the essence of language and can not step outside of it, just as
being can't step outside of its Being. W. Humboldt who was a German linguist
argued, that the inner structure of language reflects the spirit of its speakers."' And
according to Heidegger, Humboldt's work shows the possibility of an appropriate
transformation of language (Heidegger, 1993: 425).
In Being and Time , which was his attempt at a fundamental ontology, he
criticized Husserl's understanding of intentionality as metaphysical, and argued that
the understanding of Being underpinned or made possible the various modes of
3 Wilhelm von Humboldt was one of the founders of modern liberalism and placed the idea of Bildung
at the centre of his work. Bildung can be interpreted in two main ways. Firstly, it can be about
producing or giving shape. Secondly, it can be about a likeness or imitation between the original image
and its reproduction. In the former, it 's related to production according to an order that gives rise to a
form. Secondly, it 's related to a goal that should be aimed at. The latter is connected to ideas around
model and copy, original and reproduction. These two different meanings are related to two meanings
of Bildung, which come from the medieval mystics who interpreted certain passages of the Bible. The
first translates the act of creation. The second meaning corresponds to the fact that this creation or
production occurs in the likeness of a Creator. (F. Beiser.Enlightenment, Revolution andRomanticism.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 111-137). From a Heideggerian perspective, the historical
context creates Dasein and its meanings. From a Husserlian perspective, subjects can recreate
themselves and reconstitute meanings. These two different understandings are also connected with the
idea of 'self-determination' in Australia. It could either mean recreating him or herself in the
contemporary world (along Husserlian lines), or going back to some tradition along (Heideggerian
lines). The first would challenge the dominant system but the second would not.
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comportment. He did not dismiss human features such as consciousness, self-
consciousness, intentionality and reason, but they were not understood to be
toundational. He did not disagree with Husserl that intentionality was part of Dasein,
but in opposition to his interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger argued
that being-in-the-world was primary to mental activity about it because it determined
that mental activity.
He did not believe that the inheritance of concepts and language meant that the
understanding of the world is condemned to historicism and cultural relativism,
because historicism and relativism are related to the representational thinking of
metaphysics that he rejected. His rejection of representational thinking was shown
above in section 44 where he criticized the correspondence theory of truth, and he
also mentioned it in Identity and Difference, Nietzsche, vol. 2, section 16 , and it can
also be seen in section 34 of Being, and Time , where he criticized the representational
theory of meaning.
In section 34 he argued that, as a being-in-the-world Dasein has states of mind
and understandings, which it acquired from the historical environment that it was
thrown into. Communication between Daseins, which share the historical
environment, is not from the interior of one subject to the interior of another subject
because both already share the same discourse. If they did not share it. according to
Heidegger, they would not be able to communicate. This is because discourse is the
ontological foundation of language, which underlies interpretation and assertions. The
worldly being of discourse gets expressed in language, and only the discourse, which
is already shared by contemporary Daseins, can be understood. "Only he who already
understands can listen" (Heidegger, 1962: 208). What gets communicated is already
shared because talking and hearing are based on a shared understanding. This means
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that the communicated information is a sharing of what is already shared. And
keeping silent authentically is also a part of the shared discourse because to keep
silent pre-supposes that Dasein has something to say. "in that case one's reticence
makes something manifest, and does away with idle talk". Heidegger's notion of
Dasein as a being-in-the-world, therefore, also included the discourse of that world. In
other words, Dasein has language and meaning before it can use it. "sense is an
existential of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying behind them, or
floating somewhere as an intermediate domain"".
//eidegger further argued that the Greeks originally had no word for language
but later interpreted it with the logic of the 'logos', which they used to describe
phenomena. And according to him, this same understanding of language is part of
contemporary studies of language. Because the ontological foundation for human
language is the language of Being, he argued that the first person and second person
detached philosophical reflections on language are incapable of understanding the
sense that is revealed from dwelling within the linguistic practices. (Dreyfus, 219).
In connection with the first person understanding Heidegger criticized the
doctrine of signification in Husserl's Logical Investigations, vol. 11.(Heidegger,
1962: note x, 492). However, Husserl was examining signification
phenomenologically and this meant that he was not so much interested in the meaning
itself, but how the meanings get constituted. Husserl's main aim was not to study
language, but to contrast the phenomenological and genetic-psychological
clarifications of theoretical thinking and cognition, which stem from statements, "the
author attempts to give a certain account of the goals of these investigations and, in
general, of the peculiarities of phenomenological clarification of knowledge in
contrast to genetic-psychological clarification of it" (Husserl. 1975: 5).
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Both Heidegger and Husserl argued that phenomenology was about letting
things show themselves instead of being dictated to by some system, however, while
Husserl argued that people in general could criticize the system and take
responsibility for their own judgments, Heidegger was criticising the last two and a
half thousand years of philosophy. And in Being and Time , which launched his
international career, he criticized Husserl* phenomenology as metaphysical. Against
Husserfs notion of reductions he argued that because Dasein has no essence, but is
the result of its throwness, this throwness could not be bracketed out. Instead of
examining Husserl's apodictic evidence, as a method concerned with judgments and
critical distance, Heidegger criticized Husserl's distinction between the ideal and real
and argued against the notion of truth as perfect unconcealment. It could be argued
that Heidegger constructed a straw man out of Husserl's phenomenology, in order to
place it within his criticism of metaphysics and justify his repression of Husserl's
influence on his own work.
c. Determination
Husserl argued that his work has been misinterpreted on a number of occasions
and has re-written a number of introductions to his phenomenology. These include
Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcendental Logic and the Crisis .4 One
area where Husserl seems to have been misunderstood concerns his eidetic reduction.
Some scholars understand this as an example of idealism or an attempt to get to the
presence or essence. For example, in On Science and Phenomenology (1965) Marcuse
questions this aim of the reduction.
The breakthrough to the transcendental subjectivity is supposed to be the
road to uncover the foundation on which all scientific validity rests. I ask
the question: can reductive phenomenological analysis ever attain its goal,
namely, to go beyond scientific, and pre-scientific, validity and
4 These will be referenced below.
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mystification? (Arato and Gebhardt, 1994: 475)
However, in section 6 ot Cartesian Meditations Husserl argued that nothing is certain
except the critical attitude within human subjectivity. He argued that while full
certainty excludes doubt it is not apodictic because it does not exclude the possibility
ol future doubt. And this open possibility of becoming doubtful can be recognized in
advance by critical reflection on what the evidence does (Husserl 1999: 15). He also
argued that the evidence of critical reflection is itself apodictic, because no evidence
excludes future doubt. In other words, the only absolute certainty is that there is no
evidence that is beyond the possibility of future doubt, because the possibility of
critical reflection as part of consciousness, accompanies the presentation of the
evidence.
Furthermore the evidence of that critical reflection likewise has the
dignity of being apodictic, as does therefore the evidence of the
unimaginableness of what is presented with apodictically evident
certainty. And the same is true of every critical reflection at a higher level.
(McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 101)
It could be argued that Husserl was not attempting to isolate and represent some
form of truth through his reductions, but only highlighting its impossibility by
examining all the variables in the way. By way of analogy, he may not have been
pulling the motorbike apart to find the essence of the bike but examining the
complexities and interconnections of the various components. The impossibility of
getting to the apodictic essence through the complexities and interrelationships can be
seen in his Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg, (1917).
Consciousness and what it is conscious of is therefore what is left over as
field for pure reflection once phenomenological reduction has been
effected: the endless multiplicity of manners of being conscious, on the
one hand. and. on the other, the infinity of intentional correlates.
(Husserl. 1917) 5
5 From http://www.bavlor.edu/^Scott Moore essays Husserl.html p.7
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It would seem unlikely that someone using words sueh as "endless multiplicity" and
"infinity" would be advocating the possibility of reducing down to an essence. And in
the same essay it legitimises his use of the word 'pure' in pure phenomenology, by
contrasting it with the 'pure' in other disciplines. This was a criticism of the
objectivity of science.
We often speak in a general, and intelligible, way of pure mathematics,
pure arithmetic, pure geometry, pure kinematics, etc. These we contrast,
as a priori sciences, to sciences, such as the natural sciences, based on
experience and induction.
In section 6 of the Cartesian Meditations he argued that their is neither
apodictic evidence that the world exists or that it does not exist, and this means that
the existence of the world in which science rests is not certain apodictically either. He
clarifies this in the following section by saying that "the world is for us only
something that claims being." And this also applies to not just all the other beings,
objects, meanings, values, language and culture etc., within the world, but also beliefs
in their existence, non-existence or even somewhere in between. "In short, not just
corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now
on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is" (McNeill and
Feldman, 1998: 101).
While it is the phenomena itself that allows the doubts or assertions this does
not mean that the world does not exist, it still exists as it did prior, however, this shift
allows a reflecting 'philosophical' attitude as opposed to a non reflective "natural'
attitude. Reflective attitudes that can give some form of critical distance, "the meant
judgment, theory, value, end, or whatever it is still retained completely - but with the
acceptance-modification, 'mere phenomena" (McNeill and Feldman. 1998: 103).
According to Husserl, we are not confronting nothing but have gained something.
This is because the epoche "can also be said to be the radical and universal method by
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which I apprehend mysell purely;" (McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 103). Descartes
called this the cogito but in section 9 Husserl argued that the cogito is not itself
apodictic because it has an open horizon. In Being and Time Heidegger argued that
his phenomenology was not about the actual but the possible. However, in his
Introduction to the Cartesian Meditations it seems quite clear that HusserPs was also
open and about possibilities. However, unlike Heidegger's finite Dasein with the not-
yet as a debt to itself, HusserPs not-yet was open because he did not place any
absolute limits on the ego.
Husserl argued that Descartes' cogito was grounded on scholastic
presuppositions. In section 11 Husserl argued that his was a transcendental
phenomenological ego and as such its identity was not apodictic like it was for
Descartes. This is because the ego has no absolute boundaries around it; boundaries
which would need to include apodictic certainty of its own history and future
possibilities. 6 In discussing the concept of the phenomena Husserl also argued
elsewhere, that all ways of consciousness of something means that it includes "as
well, every sort of feeling, desiring, and willing with its immanent comportment'"'
(Husserl, 1982: 3).
In short, Husserl seemed to be rejecting both extremes of Materialism and
Idealism, subject and object, real and ideal etc., in order to argue that the ability to
criticize and judge the givens instead of just blindly accepting them, is part of what it
is to be human. He also argued that the framing and the critique of the framing are
ignored within genetic psychology, which understands a casual relationship between
the mind and body.
6 This is based on the principle that time is a boundary condition to identity. If time has an open
horizon then so does identity.
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Husserl s thesis, that consciousness constitutes the world, has been interpreted
as a form ot idealism whereby the existence of the world is dependent on
consciousness. However He makes it quite clear that the point of his argument is
about apodictic certainty and reflective criticism, and in many ways his argument is
similar to the Frankfurt school's notion of non-identity thinking.
We shall retain only this much: that the evidence of world-experience
would, at all events, need to be criticized with regard to its validity and
range, before it could be used for the purposes of a radical grounding of
science, and that therefore we must not take that evidence to be, without
question, immediately apodictic. (McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 102).
Heidegger's phenomenology, which distanced itself from ontic studies such as
psychology, overshadowed Husserl's phenomenology that was directly criticizing
them. And by omitting any detailed references to Husserl's work within Being and
Time he also omitted any influence Husserl may have had on his work. This would
not be inconsistent with his argument that the transfer from inauthenticity to
authenticity was based on a split Dasein with no third party influences. However,
Stephen Mulhall argued that Heidegger's windowless monad was a distortion within
his philosophy. According to him, this distortion resulted from Heidegger's need to
present himself as self-originating and to repress Husserl's influences. He further
argued that the notion of a closed split Dasein achieving authenticity was incoherent
because a capacity in eclipse could not bring about its own eclipse. He then offered a
modified version of Heidegger's inauthentic/authentic transfer, and argued that it was
not inconsistent with the rest of Being and Time.
According to the modified version, an inauthentic Dasein is one that conflates
its existential potential and its existentiell actuality. This conflation can be disrupted
by an encounter with a genuine other. The genuine other awakens otherness within
Dasein itself, and this allows Dasein to have a real relation to itself as other. This
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relation would not be self-identical as it would be within the conflated state. This new
model raises a couple ot questions. If the genuine other is considered to be authentic,
then finding out how it achieved authenticity would lead to an infinite regress. On the
other hand, it the encounter only needed to disrupt Dasein's conflation of actuality
and possibility, then the other would not need to be authentic if it was a genuine other.
Genuine other here would mean other than the norm, but not necessarily authentic
within its otherness. This otherness would then apply to Daseins from other cultures,
backgrounds, nationalities, religions or lifestyles etc. However, as a replacement for a
split Dasein's conscience, which offers an empty call, the other would not necessarily
assimilate Dasein into its life style. As an empty call from this other, Dasein would
only need to have its conflated actuality/potentiality disrupted. If a genuine other was
encountered by Dasein in an assimilated or closed society then the otherness of the
other would be obvious. On the other hand, if it was encountered within a pluralistic
mass culture then its otherness would need to be radically other to be noticed. If the
radical otherness was encountered authenticity could result by disrupting Daseins
relationship with its 'One\
As the Aboriginal understanding of land is radically different from that found in
the dominant liberal democratic system currently in Australia, then their radical
otherness could disrupt the actuality/potentiality there. And as it is also within the
sphere of globalisation, that disruption could have a knock on effect and challenge the
dominant system that Fukuyama believes marks the end of history. Unfortunately an
encounter with radical otherness does not usually have this desired outcome. In fact,
according to members of the Frankfurt School, it is usually the need for conformity
that leads to the rejection of otherness within oneself and the other. 7 It was noted
This will be discussed below.
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above how the "One Nation* form of equality based on individual needs within a
biased assimilated culture, requires the silencing of the 'other culture' which could
itself disrupt the conflated actuality/potentiality of that assimilated culture. This was
taken to be a form of racism, where the defence of the system was based on cultural
principles.
You can hardly practice these traditions when you're living in a white
man's world. 'Pauline said later.' They tried to destroy our culture. They
are still, still, trying to assimilate us, to make us disappear into their
world. (Endangered Peoples: 4)
However, the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
due to be signed in 2004, which will give Aboriginal people the right of self-
determination. is itself part of the dominant culture. It is this declaration that Hanson
criticised in her argument that all Australians should be treated equally with no one
group having an advantage over others. However, the dominant non-Aboriginal group
already do have advantages over the Aboriginal people. It is this declaration that
should address the current form of inequality, but it really depends on how the words
'self-determination' are interpreted. In agreement with Derrida's criticism of
Fukuyama, the existence of the inequality does point to the flaw within the ideal of
liberal democracy itself, however, if the words are interpreted by giving priority to
Derrida's device of differ(a)nce over and above the political context, then it could
undermine the fight for social justice. And if the 'self in 'self-determination' is
understood as Heidegger's notion of Dasein, then it is difficult to see how the
Aboriginal people could be understood as an ideological conflict, which could
challenge the dominant Western liberal democratic system in Australia. In an attempt
to overcome these limitations the next chapter will examine the type of philosophy
that Heidegger and Derrida were criticising.
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CHAPTER THREE: REDUCING RATIONALITY
a. Du(e)lism
Rene Descartes, often called the father of modern philosophy, was living at a
time ol intense religious wars, global exploration, and when Galileo was challenging
established ideas. He attempted to break with the philosophical tradition of his day
and free himself from prejudices. His method was to locate a foundation, which
would be independent of religion, custom, culture, language and other influences. In
the Meditations (1641) he argued that we acquire many prejudices, which interfere
with our reason. In an attempt to gain some autonomy by way of a secure foundation,
he developed the Method of Doubt. According to this method we should reject
everything we believe and start again. He understood truth to be what was indubitable
as opposed to hearsay and opinion, and by doubting everything, which was not
indubitable, he hoped to discover a foundational certainty on which to build.
Archimedes, that he might transport the entire globe from the place it
occupied to another, demanded only one point that was firm and
immovable; so also, I shall be entitled to entertain the highest
expectations, if I am fortunate enough to discover only one thing that is
certain and indubitable.
(Descartes, 1994: 79)
Descartes began his First Meditation with three arguments. In the Dream
Argument he argued that it was not possible to completely distinguish dream
experiences from waking experiences. In the Deceiving, God argument even
mathematics became problematic, and he may have included the Evil Demon
argument for those who would reject the notion of a deceiving God. With these
arguments he concluded that the secure base for knowledge would not lie in the
senses but in the mind. This was because an indubitable truth would be one. which
was not only free of illusions but also totally free of any determining influences. This
implied that at least part of the mind had to be completely separate from the body and
nature, which were understood to be causally determined (Descartes, 1994:74-79).
Descartes understood the mind to be res cogitans , a substance that thinks, and
the body to be res extensa, a substance that extends into space. In humans the two
substances interact via the pineal gland. Res extensa was also understood to be the
substance of the brain as well as the rest of the material world. Res extensa or
determined nature was what made science possible because it was casual. Res
cogitans or undetermined mind would seem to make any form of human science
impossible because there could be no uniformities, regularities, or laws determining a
completely free mind, for science to discover.
In the Second Meditation Descartes found his first indubitable truth that was
beyond God, the evil demon, physical and biological causal processes, history, culture
and religion. This certainty was his famous Cogito Ergo Sum (Descartes, 1994: 78-
87). According to Descartes the rebuilding of the world begins with the discovery of
the self by way of his Cogito Argument (I think therefore I am). Descartes" notion of
'self separated from subjectivity, was not only a foundation for knowledge, but also
became a foundation for the Enlightenment understanding of reason and individuality.
At the heart of the Enlightenment was the ideal of a single scientifically
organized world system governed by reason. In contrast to the prevailing pessimistic
view of humanity based on the Christian doctrine of original sin, the optimistic
Enlightenment creed stressed the possibility of planning a society on rational grounds.
Enlightenment social thought was developed on an analogy with physical science.
The desire to master nature developed into a dream of mastering society. However,
the daydream about human society being improved through knowledge and
technology had a darker side. The other side of the dream, the nightmare, was
analysed in 1947 by Adorno and Horkheimer. According to them, '"The
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Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their
sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant" (Horkheimer
and Adorno, 1979:1). The aim of their analysis was to discover why "mankind,
instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of
barbarism" (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1997: ix). Their objective was to rescue the
Enlightenment idea of emancipation by promoting critical thought.
The other type of reason that leads to domination rather than emancipation,
according to Horkheimer and Adorno, was not born in the Enlightenment but comes
from the beginnings of Western culture. It was a type of rationality that is bound to
identity and is compelled to deny, repress and violate difference and otherness. When
the 'other' is philosophy's 'other' then what is being denied or repressed is the
unpresentable, that which cannot be conceptualised, anything that lies beyond the
representations of the mind. If identity requires difference, then philosophies 'other'
constitutes a philosophical problem in that it has no concept of its otherness, in which
to give it an identity. The inability to maintain the notion of thoughts outside can lead
to the substitution of thoughts 'other', with other thoughts or empirical objects.
This problem can be extended to the liberal humanist notion of individual,
which stems from the Enlightenment. If the individual has no 'other' then the
individual has no way of constituting self-identity. In other words, the relationship
between self and other is bound to the notion of self-identity. When the 'other' is
other than white European heterosexual Christian males, then the empirical objects
can be objects such as female, gay, Jew or black etc. It is not surprising then, that
these others have been the subject matter of contemporary political discourses in the
form of sexism, homophobia. anti-Semitism and racism.
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Descartes" Method of Doubt left a legacy of two interlocking features, which are
relevant to the development of anti-racist strategies. The first was his understanding
of freedom and the elimination of subjectivity, the second was the explanatory gap
left by the separation of mind and body. If the mind/body problem stemming from
dualism is understood as a tug of war, then some theories drag the body and matter
over to the side of the mind, while others drag the mind and consciousness over to the
side of the body. Hegel's Idealism would be an example of the former, while Marx's
Materialism would be an example of the latter. Horkheimer and Adorno's notion of
'Non-Identity Thinking' is an example of the refusal to either assimilate or reduce to
one or the other sides.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) Hegel criticized the materialist
understanding of the mind/body relationship underlying phrenology and
physiognomy, "it conceals from itself the disgracefulness of the irrational, crude
thought which takes a bone for the reality of self-consciousness" (Hegel, 1997:
209). He united Descartes' res cogitans and res extensa in the direction of the former
and gave priority to subjectivity within his system. According to Hegel, reality itself
is reason and it is in the process of becoming self-conscious and free. This means that
history is the process of a rational developing system. He argued that the Absolute, in
both abstract and concrete form, developed from the objective pole towards the
subjective. On the objective side, which is the subjective concrete side, this
development went from art to religion to philosophy (Hegel, 1977: 580-591). In other
words, it went from the material towards the ideas. He also charted the stages of
history as a progress in reason and freedom from the ancient Orient through classical
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Antiquity and into the Christian-Germanic epoch, which included Feudalism,
Reformation. Enlightenment, and the French Revolution. 1
Marx and Engels criticized Hegel's system by arguing that it is the way we live
which leads to what we think rather than what we think leading to the way we live. "It
is not the consciousness of men that determines their being", wrote Marx, "but, on the
contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness". And unlike Hegel,
who charted history as a progress in reason and freedom, they charted the stages via
the types of production. "The hand mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the
steam mill society with the industrial capitalists" (Carnforth. 1955: 7). Marx also
argued that freedom was connected to the unfolding of human potentialities as "the
positive power to assert his true individuality" however, this would not be possible
under capitalism but would require communism (Oilman, 1976:114-119). And the
movement from capitalism to communism would be based on a materialist dialectic
whereby the contradictions, which force the changes, are contradictions within society
rather than contradictions within understanding.
A number of scholars known as members of the Frankfurt School adapted
Marxism to the theoretical and political needs of a later time. In his analysis of
fascism and the Holocaust. Horkheimer argued that the division of reason from the
body not only reflected the hierarchical social division of labour, but also severed
reason from its subjectivity and turned it into an uncritical and dull apparatus for
registering facts.
1 While his leaps of imagination would seem to dispel any notion of a correlation between a bump on
the skull and thought, it could be argued that if there was absolutely no correlation then portraiture
would not be possible. However, the correlation would not necessarily be a point for point
representation because this would indicate that the closer the correlation between the entity and its
representation was. such as a two dimensional photographic representation or a three dimensional
plaster cast, the closer it would come to being identified as portraiture, but this does not seem to be the
case.
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anti-philosophical spirit that is inseparable from the subjective concept of
reason, and that in Europe culminated in the totalitarian persecution of
intellectuals, whether or not they were its pioneers, is symptomatic ol the
abasement of reason.
(Horkheimer, 1974: 54)
In The Dialectics of Enlightenment llorkheimer and Adorno criticised the
Enlightenment notion ol individual by arguing that the subjectivity, which was
separated irom reason, was being replaced with a false form of individuality. A false
form of individual that is no more than
The generality's power to stamp the accidental detail so firmly that it is
accepted as such. The defiant reserve or elegant appearance of the
individual on show is mass-produced like Yale Locks, whose only
difference can be measured in fractions of millimetres.
(Adorno and llorkheimer, 1947)
In their analysis of the disappearance of autonomy, members of the I''ranklurl
School combined their theories about fascism with their studies of mass society, and
argued that economic, political, social and cultural conformity were , 1 ' g
institutionalised cohesion, and that society was becoming totally administered
producing false notions of individuality, and that the autonomous individual was
disappearing. In addition, as reason becomes more instrumental and looses interest in
striving for some objectivity, judgments become more and more relative and easily
manipulated.
According to Horkheimer (1974), the combination of subjective reason and
domination leads to a social cohesion based on submission, regression, and
conformity. Survival in the contemporary world is seen as success, an economic
success that depends on adaptation to the current environment. Io succeed within this
environment, subjects have to give up any hope of ultimate self-realization. Social
beings have to change into individual members of a powerful organization. Instead of
2 Cited in W. McNeill & K. I eldman. eds. Continental Philosophy: An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwel
Publishers Ltd., 19X4, p. 225.
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using reason to find truth it is used lor imitation and adaptation for survival.
I Iorkheimer argued that this sort ol survival tends to make people more submissive,
and social cohesion is achieved through conformity and identification with a powerful
group
lie continuously responds to what he perceives about him, not only
consciously but with his whole being, e ' 'the traits and attitudes
represented by all the collectivities that enmesh him - his play group, his
class mates, his athletic team, and all the other groups that, as has been
pointed out, enforce a more radical surrender through complete
assimilation.
(I lorkheimer, 1974: 141)
Drawing on Freud, members of the Frankfurt School argued that the mechanism
bonding individuals into a society are also of a libidinal nature. Individuals gain
gratification via the pleasure principle when they are accepted into a group. If
outsiders want to join the group they have to change and identify with it. I lie ego of
the individual within the group stands between the pleasure and reality principle. I lie
pleasure of self-awareness is sacrificed for self-preservation within the group. I his
leads to a loss of autonomy, because by opting for self-preservation the individual
neglects their development for potential self-differentiation. They lose their autonomy
because they are pre-occupied with their place in the group. This loss places a strain
on the ego, to release the strain they can either change group or retreat into their id -
regress. If regression takes place the group s social forces easily manipulate the
person, and this ensures social cohesion.
In Freudian Theory am! the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda (I (>51), Adorno
drew on Freud's In (Iroup Psychology and the Analysis of the l.go, to discuss de-
individualized social atoms that form fascist collectivities.
Socialized hypnosis breeds within itself the forces which will do away
with the spook of regression through remote control, and in the end
awaken those who keep their eyes shut though they are no longer asleep
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(Arato and Gehhardt, 1994: 137).
In Five Lectures (1970) Marcuse argued, that society is still held together by a form of
libidinal relationship, which is of reified social relations and personified things such
as cars. He added that everyday gratification remains ungratifying and this reflects a
repressive desuhlimation (Held. 1980: 137-138).
Drawing on Freud's distinction between the sex and self-preservation instincts,
and his notion that instincts were the motive force behind human behaviour, Eric
Fromm argued, that the sex instincts are more flexible than the instincts for self-
preservation because they can be "postponed, repressed, sublimated and
interchanged", and this allows a certain amount of flexibility in the satisfactions
which are on offer (Arato and Gebhardt, 1994: 480).
In Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) Ilorkheimer and Adorno argued, that the
culture industry was using entertainment to sugarcoat an ideological content of
oppression. In the ( 'ulture Industry Reconsidered (1975) Adorno argued, that popular
culture was in fact administered culture imposed from above. And in The Public
Sphere (1964) Habermas argued, that artificially induced public opinion binds
individuals to the existing situation (Bronner, 1989: 4-10).
Within the framework of the Frankfurt School's criticism of Western mass
society, it could be argued that the resolution of the Land Rights issue as a form of
separatism would be similar to changing groups, while remaining within the dominant
culture would force many into submission, regression and conformity and prevent
self-determination. However, if they were able to gain some form of autonomy,
within the existing system, it would challenge that system. If so. then this could be
beneficial to other non-Aboriginal Australians because according to Horkheimer, a
fully developed individual is the consummation of a fully developed
society. The emancipation of the individual is not emancipation from
68
society, but the deliverance of society from atomisation, an atomisation
that may reach its peak in periods of collectivisations and mass culture
(Horkheimer, 1974: 135).
As Australia is also part of the Global village, this could have the knock on
ettect ot challenging the Liberal Democratic system within other parts of the world.
This is because globalisation includes an intensification in the levels of interaction,
interconnectedness. and interdependence between the countries, states, and societies,
within the contemporary world. In an analysis of globalisation, Harvey argued that
*time-space compression' means that events in one place impact immediately on
people and places a long distance away (Harvey, 1989: 240). He further suggests
that the process is not linear and smooth but discontinuous. This would mean that here
are 'spaces' for change within the process.
Returning to the conceptual feature of racism momentarily, consciousness
seems to have a great deal of trouble with these "spaces.' Dialectically it tends to jump
from thesis to the anti-thesis. The last two thousand years of philosophy has witnessed
this as a jump from various forms of Materialism to Idealism and back again. It is also
a stumbling block for perceptions as seen in illusions such as the rabbit duck; with
logical contradictions such as the double bind in Aristotle's syllogism; the zero in
mathematics; and in Zeno's paradoxes. It is also the problem encountered with the
relation between particular and universal, subject and object, one and many, and mind
and body. It is also connected to the excluded middle, which makes identification
possible. The Greeks called it the Aporia, which means the absence of a passage. In
Of Grammatology (1976) Derrida examined them as textual gaps or stumbling blocks.
Hegel understood it as the now. Lyotard (1979:75-79) identified it as a kind of
impossibility of judgement. Because it cannot be tied down or identified, it can also
be understood as a moment of possibility, in the form of generativity. A generativity
based on our conceptual limitations. However, it tends to be our conceptual
limitations that limit its generative capacity. In order to release the generative
capacity ot reason, after it had been made impotent by severing it from subjectivity
and replacing that subjectivity with a false form of individuality, the Frankfurt School
argued tor a type of non-identity thinking. A type of thinking which would neither
identify the aporia, nor be reduced or assimilated to either one or other of the poles.
While many scholars including the Frankfurt school focused on subjectivity,
HusserFs Phenomenology was one of the first attempts to reclaim it after Descartes
banished it two hundred years earlier. Husserl was writing prior to the rise of
National Socialism but the Nazi's later denounced his Phenomenology because he
was promoting a form of rationality for everyone, including Jews and Negroes.
Husserl. like Descartes before him, was attempting to reduce prejudice. As the
conceptual feature of racism is linked to prejudice, the next section will begin by
examining that aspect of HusserFs Phenomenology.
b. The Evidence
In order to examine the conceptual features of racism and anti-racist
strategies, this section will examine HusserFs Phenomenological method. The content
of HusserFs work may not be directly related to racism, but he was attempting to
reduce prejudices within consciousness. As racism is a form of prejudice and this
thesis is examining the conceptual as well as the political features of racism and anti-
racist strategies, and HusserFs work was denounced by the Nazi's because he was
promoting a type of rationality for everyone - including 'Jews* and "Negroes*. The
importance of HusserFs development of rationality could lay in the possibility that
rationality itself could be culturally relative. Therefore an examination of his work
may permit us to explore rationality anew.
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Between about the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of
the twentieth century, the scientific reductive accounts of the mind/body explanatory
gap were pulling the mind and consciousness over towards the material realm. This
was a time when the gap was widening between philosophy and genetic psychology
(Husserl, 1970: 53-57). 3 During this time Husserl was criticising the prejudices within
the naturalistic accounts of consciousness. A number of features of HusserPs work are
important for the development of anti-racist strategies, and these include his
reductions, empathy and intersubjectivity. The first was an attempt to reduce
prejudices, the second was a mid-point between assimilation and exclusion, and the
third because of its connection with community. This section will begin with an
examination of his reductions in connection with his intentional analysis as the
constitution of identity, and then it will examine his understanding of empathy and
interubjectivity. The second section will examine Heidegger's criticism of Husserfs
Phenomenology.
Husserl's Phenomenology has been understood as a method that emphasises
the attempt to get at the truth of matters, to describe phenomena, as whatever appears
in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself in the consciousness of
the experiencer. This means that explanations are not to be imposed before the
phenomena have been understood from within. Phenomenology seeks to avoid pre-
judgements and misconstructions placed on experience in advance. It tries to reduce
prejudices drawn from religious or cultural traditions, from everyday common sense,
and from science.
In the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900-1901), which was the first volume of
his Logical Investigations , Husserl was arguing against psychologism within
3 Genetic Psychology studies the material substrate of psychic acts, (the nature of the sense organs, the
patterns of the nerves, and so on), and is mainly about causal explanations.
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philosophy. Psychologism means that the universal laws of maths and logic have
their foundations in the concrete functioning of psychological mechanisms.
Psychologism only looks at the 'real* facts of the human mind and ignores the 'ideal',
and in so doing, places philosophy under empirical psychology. Husserl argued that
the human sciences were failing because they ignored intentionality. Intentionality has
to do with the way that the mind frames the object. Consciousness, according to
Husserl, contains meanings that are its intentional content, and these meanings make
the encountered things intelligible. Failing to take intentionality into account tends to
reduce the experience of material objects to sensations, logic to psychology, and
values to feelings, which could lead to a dangerous form of relativity.
In our attacks on relativism, we have of course had psychologism in mind.
Psychologism in all its subvarieties and individual elaborations is in fact
the same as relativism, though not always recognized and expressly
allowed to be such. It makes no difference whether, as a formal idealism,
based on a 'transcendental psychology', it seeks to save the objectivity of
knowledge, or whether, leaning on empirical psychology, it accepts
relativism as its ineluctable fate.
(Husserl, 1970: 145)
Husserl argued that consciousness, which includes concepts as well as their
criticism, should transcend and be independent of those psychological functions. In
other words, consciousness or intentionalitv should not be imprisoned within human
physiology even if objective knowledge is unobtainable. In the Prolegomena to Pure
Logic, Husserl argued that the truths or validity of mathematical and logical principles
must exist independently of consciousness, even though their appearance in thought is
dependent on consciousness. For this he has been accused of being Platonic
(Kockelmans, 1994: 38). However, he was not arguing that they themselves existed
outside of consciousness, like the Platonic Forms, but that their truth or validity, as
pure logic, was not dependent on the empirical psychology and other natural sciences,
which utilize the notion of 'pure' arithmetic and logic themselves. This is because to
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be considered 'pure they must be independent of factual thinking, yet they are used
as 'pure' within the factual thinking of those sciences.
Pure logic is the scientific system of ideal laws and theories which are
purely grounded in the sense of the ideal categories of meaning; that is, in
the fundamental concepts which are common to all sciences because they
determine in the most universal way what makes science objectively
science at all: namely, unity of theory. In this sense, pure logic is the
science of the ideal 'conditions of the possibility" of science generally, or
of the ideal constituents of the ideal of theory.
(Husserl, 1975: 4)
Husserl also argued that because the truth of logical and mathematical structures
exist independently of psychological mechanisms, an investigation into the
psychological aspects of maths and logic should not be confined to psychological
science, but extended to include subjective experiences (Husserl, 1975: 3-9). This is
because the subjective experiences are also part of the founding of the original
abstractions from nature, which later get transmitted and reified via the culture and
language. In other words, maths and science are not completely separate from the
magic, rules of thumb, and other subjective experiences out of which they rose.
In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl argued that all knowledge should be
grounded on apodictic evidence in intuition. Apodictic means that the evidence is
beyond doubt. 4 Husserl understood the evidence to be a combination of the meaning
act or 'cogito' as well as the object meant or 'cogitatum', because they are two sides
of the same coin. In other words, between thinking and what is thought/ He argued
that preconceptions and prejudice form part of the synthesis of the phenomena. The
phenomena experienced within various acts of consciousness were not restricted to
4 Kant understood it to be necessary.
5 Thinking of a table, and the table thought of. are two sides of the same coin. Thinking of your hand,
and your hand thought of. are two sides of the same coin. This decentres the priority of the organ
between your ears. In many respects it is similar to Spinoza's mental and physical attributes, which
will be discussed below.
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perceptual acts, but also included other cognitive aspects such as judgments,
valuations, feelings, desires, aesthetic appreciation, language and ideals.
I here is not only 'perception' of 'real' objects, but also of 'categorical' or
"ideal objects, e.g. ol ranges, of identities and non-identities, of states-of-
affairs of every sort, of universals, etc.
(Husserl, 1975: 9)
He was interested in reducing prejudices by finding apodictic evidence (I lusserl,
1982: Section 24). liy apodictic evidence he also meant the thing itself. Not the
Kantian notion ol the thing itself , which was the noumenu , but the phenomena thing in
itself , which is the immediately given original data of consciousness. According to
Husserl, the aim ol philosophy is to describe the thing in itself , which is the data of
consciousness, without bias or prejudice. This meant that the prejudice and bias,
inherent in metaphysical and scientific theories as well as cultural presuppositions,
needed to be bracketed out so their influence on the evidence could be reduced. While
Kant had previously argued that no object could be given to consciousness as is or
without the minds modifications via the categories/' Husserl argued, that besides the
categories there were also sedimentations which prejudice the phenomena.
In his attempt to reduce the phenomena to the thing in itself , the pure
phenomena excluding sediments, Husserl bracketed out areas concerned with
objective reality such as causal origins and existential status, and subjective
association such as scientific and cultural presuppositions, and judgments about likes
and dislikes etc. He bracketed out the natural and scientific attitudes with the
philosophical reduction, and the belief in the existence of the world with the
phenomenological reduction.
The universal epoche of the world as it becomes known in consciousness
(the putting it in brackets) shuts out from the phenomenological field the
world as it exists for the subject in simple absoluteness.
'' This will be examined below.
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(McCormick. 1981: 24)
And while this suspension in the belief of the existence of an object of consciousness
could be seen as a form ot idealism, a suspension in the belief of the existence in an
object does not necessarily mean the denial of its existence. The bracketing could be
seen in a similar vein to the mathematical use of bracketing, however, when
mathematical units are bracketed they are placed outside the immediate area of focus.
In phenomenological bracketing, which is a form of critical distance, the transcendent
signified is reduced to the immanent signified of consciousness.'
I must similarly abstain from any other of my opinions, judgments, and
valuations about the world, since these likewise assume the reality of the
world. But for these, as for other phenomena, epistemological abstention
does not mean their disappearance, at least not as pure phenomena.
(Husserl. 1975: 8)
Husserl's reductions, unlike Descartes' method of doubt that ended up with a
dyadic 'ego cogito', also included the transcendental reduction that transformed the
dyadic into a triadic "ego cogito cogitatum". This was understood as the
phenomenological residue that existed in three forms, and understood as an
intentional stream of consciousness (Husserl. 1982:11; 59). According to Husserl.
when eidetically reduced the essence of the pure transcendental ego is temporality
(Husserl. 1975: LX). It is a pure stream of consciousness that precedes the time
consciousness of Kant's, which makes possible the intentionality, that is the basic
structure of consciousness. When objects appear to time consciousness as now , this
now is not part of the object but part of the ego. Now. past and future form the
temporal horizon that objects appear in. rather than part of the temporal objects that
appear. The now does not exist without the past and future, and this means, "the idea
of a separate "now" is an indivisible ideal created by abstraction" (Kockelmans. 1994:
7 Husserl's reductions share similarities w ith the later collapse of the transcendental signifier. but not
in a manner that necessarily leads to relativity.
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272-6). In Cartesian Meditations Husserl argued that an apodictic ego would need to
have apodictic knowledge of its complete past and future, and for this reason his ego,
unlike Descartes', has an open horizon.
Does not transcendental subjectivity at any given moment include its past
as an inseparable part, which is accessible only by way of memory? But
can apodictic evidence be claimed for memory?
(Husserl, 1998: 104)
Husserl also included the eidetic reduction to show how a transcendental-
phenomenological ego could free itself from sedimented opinions (Husserl, 1982:
Section 8-11). The eidetic reduction , which can be applied to the ego as well as the
other phenomena, is as an examination of the structure of objectivity. During 1923
and 1924 Husserl wrote a number of articles concerned with the ethical renewal of the
culture. In one of these articles. Renewal: Its Problems and Method , he argued that
the eidetic reduction should be applied to the socioethical sphere, where people
should take responsibility for their own judgments rather than blindly conforming
(McCormick, 1981: 326-331). And n the Paris Lectures he said that,
Once I have banished from my sphere of judgments, the world, as one
which receives its being from me and within me, then I, as the
transcendental ego which is prior to the world, am the sole source and
object capable of judgment.
(Husserl, 1975: 11)
And elsewhere he stated that,
the aim of philosophy is to prepare humanity for a genuinely
philosophical form of life, in and through which each human being gives
him - or herself a rule through reason.
(Kockelmans, 1994: 11)
HusserFs transcendental reduction could be understood as a form of
asymmetrical self-reflective criticism, this is because the transcendental reduction
posits the ego itself as phenomena among other phenomena to be analysed. And "as a
phenomenological ego I have become a pure observer of myself' (Kockelmans. 1994:
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14). In this situation the ego itself is understood as a phenomena, like any other
cogito/cogitatum synthesis, which can be analysed. And between this transcendental
reduction and the phenomenological reductions the ego and the object are transported
to a transcendental sphere, where the phenomena becomes a synthesis or constitution
ot the cogito and cogitatum, which can then be described from a noetic and a
noematic view point within the intentional analysis.
According to Paul Ricouer, Husserl was arguing for the notion of a personal
cogito in the Fourth Meditation.
Is this cogito personal or impersonal? Husserl unequivocally opts the
personal character of the ego cogito. This option is consistent with the
method itself; for if the cogito is a field of experience, the cogito is mine,
even when elevated to its eidos. The Fourth Meditation, as we shall see,
leaves no doubt about this point. The eidos ego is not the self-function in
general; it is not the power, which you, I, and all men have to say T. It is
the purity of myself reached through imaginative variations on my own
life.
(Ricouer, 1967: 92)
However, as Husserl criticized Descartes' notion of a closed ego it would be unlikely
that he would understand the ego to be personal apodictically. It was shown above
how Descartes required a certain amount of autonomy from causal determinism.
Husserl seems to be arguing that this autonomy itself is built into human
consciousness, because it is apodictically certain that there is no apodictic certainty.
The reductions could have led to solipsism because they bracketed out other
subjects; however, Husserl's overcame this problem with his notion of empathy and
intersubjectivity (Husserl, 1975: 34-35). Husserl's argued that the creation of meaning
is an active process that results from intentionality. In connection with his
understanding of intersubjectivity, this means that subjects have their own
interpretation of the world that they share through language, actions and their
encounters with others. This creates a community or intersubjectivity in which.
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various individuals have their meanings fulfilled if others agree with them, or
unfulfilled if others do not agree.
Husserl focused his understanding of intersubjeetivity within the discipline of
science. The scientific community share meanings intersubjectively and these
meanings are related to something which is empirically observable. His criticism of
psychologism was because it was based on the identity theory of the mind. I his meant
that mental events were understood to be objective and publically observable, in the
brain and nervous system. Husserl criticised the reduction of mental events to the
empirical level because it ignored the subjectivity, which was involved with
intentionality. This subjectivity was also mixed in with the scientific method, which
was understood to be 'pure' or objective. Husserl examined geometry in order to
bring out this subjective feature of science, because it is based on idealities and not
objective empirical objects.
In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl discussed two important areas in
relationship to the problem of accounting for the 'other', from the ego of the 'ego
cogito cogitatum.' One was the objectivity of the world, and the other was the reality
of the historical communities. His solution to the problem of inter subjectivity, which
is particularly relevant to anti-racist strategies, included notions of alter e%o, empathy
and community of transcendental egos. His notion of empathy was about placing
oneself in the position of the other, without reducing the other to oneself or oneself to
the other. I he notion of empathy is connected with a form of community that is not
based on exclusion and dogma, but extremely fertile because the more different ego's
there are the more different views of reality there are.
Despite all this, we come to understandings with our neighbours, and set
up in common an objective spatio-temporal fact-world as the world about
us that is there for us all, and to which we ourselves none the less belong
(Ilusserl, 10X2: 105)
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In The Paris Lectures Husserl explained how to experienee the world as an
intersubjective world, and he also gave a phenomenological description of the act of
empathy (Husserl, 1975: 34). He began by suspending belief in the existence of other
minds, and called this an egological reduction. Drawing on Leibniz he compared the
experience of others with universal expression.
We can say, with Leibniz, that within the monad, which is given to me
apodictically and originally, are the reflections of alien monads.
(Husserl, 1975: 35)
He then argued for a distinction between the intentionally belonging to the other ego,
and the intentionally belonging to the alter ego as a reflection of the ego. And because
the other egos, as alter egos, only make sense as a reflection within his ego, this leads
to the notion of empathy. Husserl also discussed the notion of intersubjectivity and
establishment of the objectivity of the world in a number of other places including the
Encyclopaedia Britannica article of 1928 section 13, and in his Fifth Cartesian
Meditation.
Husserl's phenomenology has been criticized within two main areas, his
reductions and intentional analysis' as a search for essences, and for laying too much
stress on perception (Derrida, 1989: 9). However, it must also be remembered that the
context, or in Husserl's words the external horizon in which he was working, was one
where experimental psychology was gaining a footing in the study of perception also.
While he may have stressed perception his notion of phenomena covered all
phenomena including language and its meanings. In fact many of the reductions were
directed at the meanings within language. Philosophical, scientific, and cultural
sedimented meanings, which were prejudicing the phenomenal evidence.
to understand geometry or any given cultural fact is to be conscious of its
historicity, albeit 'implicitly'. This, however, is not an empty claim: for
quite generally it is true for every fact given under the heading of
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"culture', whether it is a matter of the lowliest culture of necessities or the
highest culture (science, state, church, economic organization, etc.). that
every straightforward understanding of it as an experiential fact involves
the 'coconsciousness" that it is something constructed through human
activity.
(Derrida, 1989: 173)
And rather than searching for an essence his reductions were an attempt to free the
ego from sedimented opinions. He attempted to reduce the phenomena down to the
basic evidence, not to find some essence hut because judgments rest on
evidence. Because judgments rest on evidence it is the evidence itself that should be
examined. Even if objective knowledge is not possible people must make judgments,
which either assert or deny opinions, beliefs and knowledge. People can assert or
deny their own past judgments or the judgments from some authority or tradition. As
the evidence changes so can the judgments that rest on it. Sometimes judgments are
based on past judgments, which rested on a certain evidence which may or may not
any longer be believed to be true, yet the judgment underlying the current judgment
still occupies a place within a tradition. Husserl examined this within the Origin of
Geometry , which was examined in connection with Derrida's work.
Derrida's Deconstruction was influenced by the work of Heidegger who
argued that subjects (which he replaced with Dasein) are constituted by the things that
o
Husserl tried to bracket out through the reductions. He replaced Husserl's
intentionality with comportment because Dasein as a being-in-the-world with no
human essence preceded thinking about the world. In addition he argued that the
phenomena of phenomenology was not consciousness of evidence but Being, and the
study of Being required an examination of the student of Being which is Dasein. And
in Being and Time . which launched his international career and overshadowed
Husserfs work, he defended psychologism against Husserl's criticism.
8 Although Heidegger tried to bracket out the technological attitude himself.
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Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into
two ways ot Being - two 'levels' which can never be pieced together in
such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing? Is
not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation?
(Heidegger, 1962: 256).
c. Circumstantial Evidence
Heidegger distinguishing his notion of phenomenology from that of Husserl.
by arguing that being-in-the-world preceded thinking about the world and therefore,
the ontological base was not intentionality but comportment. He argued that the
phenomena of phenomenology, was not consciousness of evidence but Being.
Husserl's Phenomenology was part of Heidegger's over-all criticism of traditional
philosophical understandings of Being and time, understandings that presupposed
Being and time to be separate prior to the various attempts at re-unifying them. Being
was understood as that which did not change, and time was understood as the
changing realm of existence. "It is also held that there is a 'cleavage' between
"temporal" entities and the 'supra-temporal' eternal, and efforts are made to bridge
this over" (Heidegger, 1962: 39). Heidegger argued, that the metaphysical attempts to
unify the changeless and the changing distorted Being by representing it as a kind of
presence (Heidegger, 1962:36-49). He criticized the notion of presence, as objective
being, because it presupposed an independent subjectivity. He argued, "there is no
such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness" of an entity called 'Dasein* with another entity
called 'world'" (Heidegger, 1962: 81). Dasein cannot understand the world
objectively because this presupposes that Dasein's understanding can be ahistorical.
however. Heidegger's notion of Dasein is profoundly historical. 4 According to him.
Being and time are not separate, but Being should be understood in terms of time.
9 Heidesmer's notion of Sorge. which was articulated in respect to time but not to space, underpinned
the distinction between inauthenticitv and authenticity on the basis of temporality. His notion of
authenticity will be referred to below in relation the •self-determination. It is worth pointing out here,
however, that the Aboriginal people have a different notion of time and space to that of the Western
tradition that Heidegger is criticising.
8 1
Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any
understanding whatsoever ot Being" (Heidegger, 1962: 1). With this argument he
began his destruction of metaphysics, which influenced later scholars.
One of the problems with identifying Being with presence, according to
Heidegger, is that it leads to an obsession with the accurate and effective ahistorical
representation of beings within philosophy, science, and technology, and an attempt to
gain control over them. Heidegger called this the Forgetfulness of Being, within his
criticism of metaphysics, but focused his later argument around Enframing and
technological domination. 0 (The Frankfurt school's notion of instrumental reason,
which was discussed above shares similarities with Heidegger's Enframing).
In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger utilized a number of hyphenated words to
highlight the inseparability of subjectivity and objectivity." For example in his anti-
Cartesian section 12, he argued that Dasein as a being-in-the-world is not a subject
related to an objective world but is always already present in it. And in sections 25-27
Dasein as being-with-others is always already in joint situation with others. In section
16 he understood objects within the world of Dasein as ready-to-hand when they are
not brought out into awareness, however, when something goes wrong which makes
them a focus they are understood as present-al-hand. When present-at-hand they are
understood as the objective part of the subject/object relationship within metaphysical
thought.
10 Heidegger understood the metaphysical separation of Being and time and the representation of their
reunification as presence, as the abandonment of Being which he related to technological exploitation
and nihilism. For a later example of this see (Martin Heidegger, "A Question Concerning Technology,"
in Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger, ed. David Farrell [London: Routledge, 1993]. pp. 31 1-341). It is
worth notinii that Kant had earlier made a distinction between the phenomena and noumena. which also
criticised the notion of an accurate subjective interpretation of the object. This is because the closer you
<>eto the limit between them, the further you move away from both the subjective and objective poles.
This resembles Zeno's paradox mentioned above and is related to the apoira's as the limit of
consciousness.
" It is worth noting that he wrote in the German language and his play with language makes English
translations difficult.
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Heidegger argued that the forgetfulness of Being was only possible because it
was wholly other. While there are many differences between things such as stones,
trees, animals etc., the greatest difference is the ontological difference, which is the
difference between Being and being. 12 Even though there is an ontological difference
between Being and being Heidegger tried to find a path from the being of humans,
which he called Dasein, to Being itself. This procedure was reversed in his later work
where he tried to open a path to Being in a meditative and/or aesthetic way to gain an
understanding of being-in-the-world in light of Being.
In Section one of Being and Time Heidegger argued that the meaning of Being
had been forgotten. In the very first line he wrote that, "This question has today been
forgotten". A little further down he wrote that there was a "necessity for restating the
question about the meaning of Being." Heidegger rejected the metaphysical notions,
including his interpretation of Husserl's work, where transcendental subjectivity or
consciousness is related to objectivity, and he replaced it with his phenomenology
based on comportment to investigate the meaning of Being. He understood truth to be
an unconcealedness and concealment, which is currently being repressed by the
metaphysical horizon of understanding, but which stems from the earlier notion of the
Greek word 'aletheia', the unconcealedness of what is present. According to
Heidegger, traditional metaphysics is the wrong way to study the Being of beings
because Being "is something that proximally and for the most part does not show
itself at all" (Heidegger. 1962: 59). And while it does not show itself it belongs to
what does shows itself and. as such, constitutes its meaning and ground. 1"
12 The different beinsis here equate with Husserl's notion, that the study of different things in the world
are only separated by the disciplines, but the scientific method underpins all of them. He wanted the
philosophical attitude to operate as a regulator - like a critical distance.
13 Heidegger linked Being, which constitutes meaning and ground, to temporality, where as Husserl
linked it to the time consciousness.
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In section 7 ot the second Introduction in Being, and Time Heidegger described
his phenomenology, as a more appropriate method for investigating the Being of
being than other traditional ontologies. This is because Dasein misinterprets itself
through the tradition, which it has been thrown into. A tradition, which has served to
conceal Dasein from itself. This is because it uses the categories of the tradition that
do not belong to it, in order to interpret itself. Heidegger argued that the Metaphysical
categories should be destroyed in order to uncover what they have covered. 14 "The
question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through
the process of destroying the ontological tradition" (Heidegger, 1962: 49)
Heidegger divided section 7 into three parts: The concept of Phenomenon and
The concept of Logos that separated phenomena from logos, and The preliminary
conception of phenomenology* which re-joins them up again into phenomenology. In
the first one he described four interconnected structures of phenomena and argued that
only the later three are included in traditional notions. The first was "that which
shows itself in itselfwhich is interconnected with "phenomena as semblance" which
is a modification of the first, then "appearance" which shows itself in a way that
announces something else, and "mere appearance. " ;5 Heidegger then argued that the
first is the phenomena of phenomenology, the Being of beings or "that which shows
itself in itself' (Heidegger, 1962:51-55).
In the second part of section seven Heidegger discussed four different
understandings of the word 'Logos'. Logos as a making manifest, logos as language,
logos as synthesis, and logos as being true or false. Truth for Heidegger is letting
"them be seen as something unhidden" and being false amounts to "deceiving in the
sense of covering up" (Heidegger, 1962: 56-57). Heidegger understood truth and
14 Husserl was interested in showing that the objective sciences were themselves a result of tradition,
and therefore also subjectively constituted instead of being purely objective.
15 This is similar to Kant's notion of phenomena limited by the categories.
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falsity as uncovering and covering, and argued that the other traditional forms of
logos are related to ratio as reason, ground and relation, which are connected to
judgments.
In the third part ol section seven Heidegger put together the phenomena as a
type ot "showing" and logos as a "letting be seen", and argued that the formal
meaning of phenomenology is "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the
very way in which it shows itself from itself' (Heidegger, 1962: 58). He then argued
that the meaning of this method lies in interpretation, but this interpretation has been
made more difficult by a tradition of interpretation, which stems from the ontological
sections of Plato's Parmenides and chapter four in book seven of Aristotle's
Metaphysics (Heidegger, 1962: 63). The meaning of phenomenology for Heidegger is
not about letting be seen of what shows itself but the letting be seen of what does not
show itself, but which is connected to what does show itself, which is the Being of
beings and not the being of Being connected to traditional ontologies. 16
Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities;
yet it pertains to every entity. Its 'universality' is to be sought higher up.
Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every
possible character, which an entity may possess.
(Heidegger, 1962: 62)
Because the Being of being, as the phenomena of Heidegger's phenomenology
rather than the being of Being, does not show itself it has to be brought out. This
bringing out requires an investigation of Dasein because Dasein is what brings it out
by interpreting Being. Without Dasein there would be no Being but only the entities.
And because Dasein interprets through its everyday phenomenal experience, this
everyday experience needs to be examined to uncover the ground or ontology of the
everyday or ontic experience. And this ground is the Being or ontological structure of
16 This is where Heidegger understands phenomenology to be hernieneutical rather than transcendental.
85
the everyday experiences which, according to Heidegger, is the care structure. And
later on in the second division Heidegger argued that time grounds this structure of
care. This joined Dasein, as the meaning of human being, to time (Heidegger, 1962:
364). Dasein is linked to temporality within its understanding of the world. And in
section six he argued that when Dasein is thrown into a historical moment of the One,
and therefore its own historical meaning, this historical meaning, which can he seen
as a dogma conceals Dasein from itself. Heidegger understood this concealing as a
form of repression, which prevented authenticity.
When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it
'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that
it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us
and delivers it over to self-evidence.
(Heidegger. 1962: 43)
The context of the essentialist/social constructivist debate in Australia could
be understood as an extension of the Western metaphysical tradition, as Heidegger
understands it. As the Aboriginal people have been encultured into this tradition by
two hundred years of Western domination, the possibility of self-determination in the
form of self-formation, may have to uncover what that tradition has concealed. On
one level, this could mean bypassing the debates that are an extension of that
tradition. On another level, it might mean a realisation that the type of reason being
criticised is not universal. The importance of Husserl's development of rationality
may lay in the possibility that rationality itself could be culturally relative. This means
that the criticism of Western notions of reason, which are central to the
essentialist/social constructivist debates, may be a criticism of a type of reason that is
in some way different from Husserl's. Not a difference based on a philosophy that
denies and represses the Other of thought, but a difference understood by Husserl as
"what is effectively seen is seen in light of what is not effectively seen .
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With this in mind one could draw on Derrida and argue, that Husserl's ideas,
which were not effectively seen may have been reinscribed into the work of
Heidegger. It could also be argued, that the 'difference' between Heidegger and
Husserl's philosophy, and Heidegger's denial of Husserl's influence, could be
understood as a violence that left the traces, which allowed Mulhall's re-interpretation
and new model.
[Heidegger's need to deny his dependence on Husserl| led to a
fundamental mutilation of the potential wholeness and integrity of his text
- a distortion of the fit between its form and its content that amounts to a
distortion of its authenticity.
(Mulhall, 1996: 136)
However, we can never know for sure because we can never reactivate back to those
origins. This is due to the gaps or aporias between the signifier and signified that
allows the slippage, which allows different interpretations to occur. It allowed me to
foreground one interpretation of Husserl's Origin of Geometry and put the other
interpretations on hold. Perceptually, it allows the foregrounding of black squares on a
chessboard while putting the white ones on hold.
87
It is an example of what Husserl was referring to within his intentional analysis in
connection with the external and internal synthesis. Husserl understood it as, what is
effectively seen is seen in light of what is not effectively seen (Husserl, 1973: 31-39).
This could apply to perception or a constitution from something ambiguous like ka
small bike shop". It could also apply to the constitution of a "One People, One
Nation. One Flag'"'Australia.
It is impossible to see the inside and the outside of the box at the same time even
though they both exist at the same time.
lip!
Heidegger's 'not effectively seen' is the time we live in which frames what we see.
Derrida's "not effectively seen" is the bike shop that sells mopeds.
You can hardly practice these traditions when you're living in a white
man's world, 'Pauline said later.' They tried to destroy our culture. They
are still, still, trying to assimilate us, to make us disappear into their
world. (Endangered Peoples: 4)
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CONCLUSION:
rhe aim of this thesis was to examine the cognitive and political features of
racism, in order to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies for the
twenty first century. It was argued that past forms of racism were based on biological
features but contemporary forms are based more on cultural features. The former stem
from the Enlightenment period that was also a time of European expansion, and the
latter seem more related to the period of globalisation. However, according to Caleb
Rosado, there is no real difference between these two because racism is not about
biological or cultural features but about power and privilege. It was also argued that
many anti-racist strategies, which were developed in order to critique the former,
usually criticise essentialist notions of identity. However, this critique has not only
tended to undermine the identities of those who base their social justice strategies on
essentialist identities, but arc also ineffective in countering racism based on notions of
fluid identities. For example, according to Pauline Hanson there is no difference
between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. In her criticism against reverse
racism she argued that equality should be based on individual needs rather than race.
According to her, they are all Australians and should be treated equally with no one
group being given advantages over the other. It follows from this that anti-racist
strategies are context dependent rather than universal.
Prior to the Enlightenment period identity was based on lineage but after the
enlightenment identity was based on population. Some populations were understood
to be inferior and both Nazi's Germany and Colonial Australia tried to purify their
races. Hanson is currently attempting to purify the culture in Australia. In order to
save their culture the Aboriginal people must base their identity on lineage. This
implies that they must take an essentialist stand. However, the social constructivists
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argue that in making an essentialist stance the Aboriginal people are participating in
their own domination. Against this charge it has been argued that the extension of
Western tradition into the Australian context, which includes the essentialist/social
constructivisf s debates, represents a new type of paternalism in Aboriginal studies.
This is where white scholars try to preserve their role as 'experts' who can help
decide on how to constitute the identity of the 'other' because,
When Aborigines seek to give a mythological content to, or to reclaim, a
primordial past for themselves then they are accused of essentialism and
of participating in their own domination. This is identity without content
and without a primordial past; it is identity stripped to the bare logic of
being simply a relation. The demand that Aborigines reduce their popular
consciousness along the lines of a social theory of identity is a request that
they become conscious of themselves as purely relational identities; they
are to be resisters without producing an essence for themselves. (Lattas,
1993: 245-6)
Because this new paternalism could be included within the globalisation of Western
values, it is worth mentioning that the eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers
found little to object to, in the European advance into the non-European world
(Poole, 2000: 10). This demonstrates that ruling over the constitution of identity is no
different to rubbing out the song lines and dividing up the continent into separate
states or renaming the flora and fauna in non-Aboriginal language (Chatwin, 1987).
The difference between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people within this
thesis was presented as a difference between understandings of land ownership. The
decision of the High Court of Australia in 1992, with regards to the Maho verses-
Queens land case, has been understood as a breakthrough in Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal relations (Stephenson. 1995). This case, with its recognition of Native
Title . brought the issue of Land Rights to the forefront of Australian politics. The
issue of Land Rights is based on the notion that the Aboriginal people were the
original inhabitants of Australia. It has been argued that this court decision had a
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positive and negative outcome. On the positive side it gave many Aborigines the
opportunity to have their ownership of traditional land legally recognized. On the
negative side, Native Title was recognized within the existing legal system. This
meant that it could recognize that Aboriginal people had a form of property rights
over portions ol the continent prior to 1788, but it could not recognize the Aborigines
legal and political sovereignty. It could not do this because it would be outside of its
powers to do so. This is because British sovereignty was the foundation of the court's
own authority (Poole, 2000: 11). This implied an inequality in the power relation
between the two cultures.
Prior to British settlement in Australia, there were about a million Aborigines
spread over the continent with a range of different life styles and cultures. It has been
estimated that there were over two hundred and fifty different languages with six
hundred dialects (Bourke, 1994). These different communities became one people, the
Aboriginals as opposed to the non-Aboriginals, both conceptually and politically,
through the experience of colonization. The Aboriginal people, who make up about
2% of the population in Australia, are now spread out over the continent, some living
in the rural areas, some in traditional communities, and others in the urban towns and
cities (Poole, 2000: 12). It follows from this that the Aboriginal people cannot be
easily categorised.
The Third Article of the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples , submitted to the United Nations in 1994. reads, "Indigenous Peoples have
the right of self-determination". If this is signed it will mean that the Aboriginal
people will be able to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development (Poole, 2000: 12). If the Aboriginal
people (as a group) are identified from an ancestral perspective then all contemporary
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Aboriginal people are part of the same group. However, every proeess of politieal
unification implies some measure ot homogenisation and the assimilation or exclusion
ot difference. This not only applies to Hanson's One Nation but also to the Aboriginal
people. The Aboriginal people or "self as a group, in the self-determination section of
the Draft , might mean that all Aboriginals are free to go back to the past traditions,
cultures and languages, or it might mean a process of self-formation. The former,
which would exclude some of the Aboriginal population, would lead to separatism
within Australia while the latter, which would not necessarily exclude some of the
Aboriginal population, would lead to a certain amount of autonomy within the
dominant non-Aboriginal political, economic and social context. The former is closely
related to the Land Rights issue, the latter to Aboriginal sovereignty. The former is
related to freedom from the dominant liberal democratic system, the latter is related to
freedom to within the dominant system. We may deduce from this that in some cases
the Aboriginal people can gain freedom from the dominant system via separatism,
(living on land where they can continue their traditional way of life), but this does not
challenge the dominant liberal democratic system. For this reason, it could be
understood as an example of Rosado's notion of institutional racism. It could be
understood as institutional racism for two reasons. Firstly, because the denial of rights
to Aboriginal people had become an international embarrassment (Castles and Vasta.
1996: 8), a decision to compensate for the past wrongs actually defended the
dominant system from international criticism. And secondly, the Aboriginal people
were compensated in a way that did not challenge the system itself. We may infer
then that this situation would not represent the ideological conflict, which could
challenge Fukuyama's notion of the end of history.
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1he other type of freedom, presupposed in the Draft Declaration, is
'freedom to within the dominant system. In order for self-determination, in the form
of self-formation, to have some possibility then 'freedom to" must include some form
of autonomy, beeause the core idea of autonomy is that of sovereignty over oneself or
self-governance. However, in connection with Heidegger's notion of Dasein this type
of autonomy would not be possible. Heidegger criticised Western philosophy and
'fallen' human existence for privileging the disclosure of the entity over the
concealment of Being but argued that philosophy and 'fallen' Dasein could become
more authentic. The former could achieve authenticity by a realization of the radical
finitude of disclosure, the latter by the realisation of their radical finitude. lie argued
against the notion of freedom or autonomy, but described how Dasein's authenticity
could eclipse inauthenticity as a being-towards-death on the onlological level, and by
a call of conscience on the ontic level. This implies that the Aboriginal people would
not have the autonomy required for self-governance. However, Heidegger's
understanding of authenticity stemming from a call that was not from a third party
was criticised by Mulhall who argued, that there were inconstancies in Heidegger's
philosophy that stemmed from his need to distance himself from llusserl and this
distorted his philosophy. In addition, within this distancing Heidegger also distorted
Ilusserl's philosophy.
Husserl's Phenomenology was a development of lirentano's notion of
intentionality, which overcame many of the earlier limitations. I,ike llusserl Hrcntano
was also challenging the newly emerging psychology. In 1X74 he published his
Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint , this was the same year that Wundt
published his Principles of Physiological Psychology. In this book Wundt established
the alliance between experimental psychology, anatomy and physiology of the central
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nervous system. He was appointed professor of physiology at Leipzig in 1875 and
established the first laboratory in the world. The Institute for Experimental
Psychology , which aimed at the advancement of experimental psychology. During the
turn of the century, when the gap between philosophy and psychology was widening.
Husserl was attempting to overcome the dangerous form of relativity, which he
detected in the limitations of genetic psychology (Husserl. 1970: 53-57). He was
critical of psychologysm within philosophy because concepts as well as their
justification and criticism in consciousness, should transcend and be independent of
physiological functioning (Husserl, 1970: 145). He argued that philosophy should
focus on subjectivity in the examination of consciousness. This was because the
phenomena experienced in various included other cognitive aspects such as
judgements, valuations, feelings, desires, aesthetic appreciation, language and ideals
(Husserl, 1975: 9).
Husserl further argued that the scientific method underpinning genetic
psychology was not as pure and objective as it seemed. He argued that the empirical
sciences ignored the subjectivity within their own methods. In Book 1 of Ideas
(1913)' he overcame the limitations of Brentano's theory of Intentionality (Brentano.
1874). In order to challenge the omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence of the
scientific method, Husserl reclaimed the subjectivity that Descartes had denounced
two centuries earlier. In order to study consciousness and focus on subjectivity
Husserl developed a number of Reductions , the Intentional analysis (which has also
been called the Constitutional analysis) and theories about Empathy and
Inter subjectivity.
1 Translated by F. Kerstein asBook 1: General Introduction to a Pure
Phenomenology. 1982
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Husserl s Phenomenological reduction was an attempt to move from the
natural attitude to a philosophical attitude (Husserl, 1982: 3-36). The Transcendental
reduction was an attempt to reduce the natural human ego and the natural psychic life
ot a transcendental-phenomenological ego, the to realm of transcendental-
phenomenological self-experience (Husserl, 1975: 6-12). The Eidetic reduction and
Arbitrary variation were intended to reach apodictic evidence - the combination of
cogito or thinking, and cogitatum or what is thought (Husserl, 1982: 8-11). In the
Constitutional analysis Husserl examined the synthesis from a noematic and noetic
perspective, and examined the relationship between the internal and external horizons.
In the Neomatic description he examined how the unity of one identity did not depend
on the various acts but on the intentional correlates or noemata (Husserl, 1982: 326-
29). In the Noetic description he examined how the unity of different acts of
perception did not depend on the temporal relationship between them. He also
examined the Acts of Constitution in the synthesis of the external and internal
horizons, and argued that what is effectively perceived is perceived in light of what is
not effectively perceived (Husserl, 1982: 51-55).
The reductions could have led to solipsism because they also bracketed out the
existence of other subjects. Husserl overcame this problem with his notion of
Empathy and Intersubjectivity (Husserl. 1975: 34-35). He understood the creation of
meaning to be an active process that results from intentionality. His understanding of
intersubjectivity was that subjects have their own interpretation of the world that they
share through language, actions and their encounters with others, and this creates a
community of intersubjectivity. Within the discipline of science, the scientific
community share meanings intersubjectively, and these meanings are related to
something that is empirically observable. In relation to the Identity theory of the mind.
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mental events are understood to be objective and public ally observable in the brain
and nervous system. Husserl was criticising the dominance of this form of
psychologism by arguing that ideals and meanings etc. were not publicly observable.
Husserl's critique of psychologism was overshadowed by the publication of
Being and Time in 1927, where Heidegger replaced Husserl's intentionality with
comportment. Heidegger replaced Husserl's subject with a finite Dasein and
developed an epistemology according to which meaning is totally dependent on
context. Heidegger argued that we could never understand entities fully and
immediately but only partially and discursively. We can never know things in their
essence but only in the meaning they have in a certain context. Heidegger argued that
being-in-the-world was ontologically prior to consciousness-in-the-world. According
to him. things such as hammers are ready-to-hand before they are present-at-hand.
However, it was pointed out that Husserl was not a carpenter but a philosopher and
his broken hammer was the psychologism within philosophy, which he was criticizing
as a dangerous form of relativity. Here we can conclude that while Heidegger made
all meaning dependent on context he ignored the context of Husserl's work.
Heidegger's critique of objectivity, which made all meaning depends on a
particular interpretive horizon, laid the foundations for the 'Hermeneutical Turn'
along with critiques of essentialism including Derrida's work. In his criticism of the
"metaphysics of presence' Derrida argued that there are gaps, supplements and
contradictory tensions within texts that can be exposed to reveal different meanings.
His device of differ(a)nce is what allows one meaning to be fore grounded while
others are put on hold. In his deconstructive reading of Fukuyama's End of History
Derrida pointed to the way Fukuyama glossed over the aporia between Liberal
democracy and its ideal. In his deconstructive reading of Husserl's Origin of
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Geometry he argued that the origin could never be reactivated because it can only be
reinterpreted trom its inscription within the tradition. Derrida's argument focused on
Husserl's notion that there was some objectivity in the origin in order for it to be
recognised. I his thesis presented a different understandingof I lusserl 's Origin, and in
doing so it confirmed Derrida's argument about the different meanings on the surface
of the text.
This thesis argued that in the Origin, Husserl was examining a science that
was based on idealities rather than on publicly observable empirical objects (objective
facts). In this sense geometry is very close to other ideals that are shared
intersubjectively. Husserl argued that there were accepted objective facts within
geometry that were originally mixed in with subjectivity (not objective as Derrida
argued against Husserl). llusserl also argued that accepted beliefs within the non-
scientillc intersubjectivity (community) were also the result of subjectivity. He argued
that these - like the objective facts in science - could be verified or denied by
reactivation. Ideas could also be verified or denied by checking them against other
things within the same community, but the intersubjectivity of that community places
certain limits that can be critiqued by the reactivation, according to Husserl.
Husserl's intersubjectivity and reactivation as a form of criticism, was overshadowed
by Heidegger's argument that Daseins already share the same discourse and can only
speak from out of it. Hence it is the case that Heidegger's work not only
overshadowed Husserl's but also covered over llusserl's method of critical thought.
The interpretation of the land leases are at the heart of the land rights issue.
The only way the Aboriginal people can benefit is if the leases are interpreted as
literally as possible. This is because the leases were given out to the white settlers for
pastoral purposes. If they want to change the way they are using the land then, on a
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literal interpretation, the leases are no longer valid and the Aboriginals get the land
baek. II they are interpreted in a different way, then the leases are still valid.
Aceording to deeonstruelion, there is a multiplicity of interpretations and we should
not privilege one over the other. However, even if linguistic and conceptual grids do
always mediate our access to reality, there are still some interpretations of reality that
are more just than others.
If'Self-determination' is interpreted in such a way that it gives the Aboriginal
people the opportunity to retrieve their tradition and live separately in certain areas, il
may not challenge the globalisation of Western values. This is because it might only
materialise as a twenty first century equivalence to the earlier forms of ghettos and
reserves. If the declaration is interpreted in such a way that the Aboriginal people can
determine themselves within the present dominant non-Aboriginal society, then il
could offer a challenge to Western liberal democracy. Not to the ideal of liberal
democracy, found within Derrida's criticism of Fukuyama's argument, but as an
example of llusserPs notion of empathy. According to this notion, the other is
encountered in a way that neither reduces the other to oneself nor oneself to the other
neither assimilation nor exclusion. Admittedly, llusserPs empathy was within the
transcendental Held, however, this was only because he bracketed out existence. In
addition, the tug of war between materialism and idealism and the problematic nature
of the mind/body relationship, suggests that HusserPs transcendental field may be just
one side of a two-sided coin. According to Spinoza in the Ethics, where he was
arguing against Descartes' distinction between the mind and body, the mind and body
or thought and extension might be different attributes of the one substance.
Hence it is manifest that, although two attributes arc conceived as really
distinct, that is, one is conceived without the aid of the other, we cannot
thence conclude that they constitute two beings, or. two different
substances. (Spinoza, 1989: 9)
Hence we can conclude that the ability to conceive of the mind in light of
the body, and vice versa, is the same thing that allows something to be perceived in
light of what is not effectively perceived. It could also be argued that MulhalTs model
could be applied to Husserl's empathy in a way that compensates for the limits of the
transcendental field. And if the Aboriginal people are understood to be radically other
in terms of their understanding of land ownership, then this could disrupt the
conflated actuality/potentiality of the Western understanding.
There is still the question of who these Aboriginal people are. Who is this self
that is going to determine itself in order to disrupt the conflated actuality/potentiality?
The Aboriginal people have been part of a white dominated culture for over two
hundred years. This itself would conceal the self that is to determine itself. Heidegger
criticised Husserl's reductions on the basis that what Husserl tried to reduce was itself
that which constitutes consciousness. If Heidegger is right then we are our prejudices.
Heidegger also argued that a being-towards-death could gain some form of
authenticity. This notion could be extended to the idea of the death of a culture. That
is the position the Aboriginal people face today. Their strategy for saving the culture
is to take an essentialist stance. It is this essentialism that they are being criticised for.
Since we know that undecidables and fluid identities are a good strategy when
racism is based on notions of essences and fixed identities, we may infer that fixed
identities are a good strategy when racism is based on notions of fluid identities. It
was noted above, that the inability to maintain the notion of thought's outside can lead
to the substitution of thought's "other' with other thoughts, or empirical "others" such
as black, gay. Jew or female etc. The anti-thesis of turning the inability of accessing




empirical undecidables, is 110bolter if il too becomes another grand narrative which
denies the excess. Instead of swinging from the thesis to the anti-thesis and back again
at ;i later date a different type of rationality may be more beneficial. Since we know
th;it Ihe importance of Musseil's development of rationality could lie in the possibility
that rationality itself may be culturally relative, we may deduce that the criticism of
Western notions of reason, which are central to the essentialist/soeial constrnctivist
debates, may be a criticism of a type of reason which is incoinpossible with I InsserPs.
Therefore we may say that an uncovering of llusscrl s philosophy from the tradition,
which has covered it up, may enable us to think and exist differently. However,
whether or not these kinds of conceptual and practical political dilemmas can ever be
fully articulated or explained is itself undetermined, but we do know that the evidence
is being disseminated.
l o t )
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
BOOKS
Adam. H. and Moodley. K. The Opening of The Apartheid Mind: Options for the New-
South Africa. Berkeley : University of California Press. 1993.
Adorno, 1. Negative Dialectics. London: Routledge, 1990.
Arato. A. & Gebhardt. E. eds. The Essential Frankfurt School Reader. New York:
Continuum Publishing Company. 1994.
Banton. M. Racial Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987.
Bourke. E. and Edwards. B. (eds.) Aboriginal Australia. St Lueia: University of
Queensland Press. 1994.
Bronner. S. & Kellner. D. eds. Critical Theory and Society. London: Routledge,
1989.
Burleigh. M. and Wippermann. W. The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991.
Cabanis. P. J. G. On the Relation Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man.
Trans. M. Saidi. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1981.
Castles. S. and Vasta. E. The Teeth are Smiling: The persistence of racism in
multicultural Australia. St. Leonards. NSW: Allen and Unwin. 1996.
Chatwin. B. Songlines. London: Picador Press. 1987.
Curtin. P. The Images of Africa: British Ideas and Action 1780-1850. London:
Macmillan. 1965.
Davidson. Art. Endangered Peoples. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. 1993.
Deleuze. G. Foucault. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1988.
The Fold. London: The Athlone Press Ltd., 1993.
Deleuze. G. & Guattari. F. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. R.
Hurley. M. Seem. H. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1983.
Derrida. J. Speech and Phenomenon. Evanstone: Northwestern University Press,
1973.
Of Grammatology. Baltimore: J.H. University Press. 1976.
Dissemination. London: Althone Press. 1981.
Glas. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.
The Truth in Painting. Chicago University Press. 1987.
Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction. Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press. 1989.
Specters of Marx. London: Routledge 1994.
Descartes. R. A Discourse on Method : Meditations and Principles. Trans. J. Veitch.
London: J.M. Dent. Orion Publishing Group, 1994.
Dollimore. J. Sexual Dissidence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1991.
Farias. V. Heidegger and Nazism. Trans. P. Burrell. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press. 1987.
Faubion. J. Ed. Michel Foucault: Aesthetics. Vol. 2. Trans. R. Hurley and others.
London: Allen Lane. Penguin Press. 1998.
Ferry. L. & Renaut. A. Heidegger and Modernity. Trans. F. Philip. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1990.
Foucault. M. Madness and Civilization. Trans. R. Howard. New York: Vintage
Books. 1973.
The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1. London: Penguin
Books. 1998.
1 0 1
Pisciplinc aiul Punish. I oikIom Penguin Books, l l )1) l
\ /<j]dness ami Ciyil i /at ion. I ondon Routledge. l l ) l ) 7.
Iuku\ aina, I ! he L nd i >// hsl t >r\at hi the I l is t \ tan Penguin, I lai niondsw 01il l , 11)1)1
Carvey, M. / i fe i i inl lessons Berkeley I ' ni \ ersi t \ ol California Press, l l ) S '
(i iddens, \ / / ; t ( onsei/ncnccs <>/Mtulernity Cambridge Poli l \ Press, l l )4) 0
Modernity i ind Self-Identi ty Cambridge Poht\ Press, l l )1) l
Ci i Ipi11, R. Ihe Poli t ici i l Lconomy of InicrniUiotuil delations l*rincoli>n Prineeton
Universi tx Press, l l ) S7.
(i i l roy, P. ' Ihebndol Anti Raeisni , in \Y Ital l and.I Solonios (e</.v) A\/ iv i iml
I Deal Polit ics I oiklon: Maenii l lan Press, l l )4) D
(iolding, S. ( . i ranisei 's Pemocratic theory ( 'ontrihutions to o Post I ibcii i l
Pcmocracy Toronto: Universih of Toronto Press, |00. \
the eiyht tccl inoloyics i>fotherness I oiklon Roulledge, l l )4) /
Cray, C. ed. the ( 'yhory I loth/hook I ondon Routledge, |0 l)>.
Ciregorv, R. ed. I he ( hford ( 'ompamon to the Mind (Klord l H IP, l4)S /
l larvey, I) , ihe ( 'audit ions of Postmoilernity (Klord llasi l I t laekwell , l l ) Sl>
I laxer, W . I l ie Hoily of this Ileath. Stanford, ( al i lornia: Stanford I i in\ ersih Press,
1006.
1legel , ( i . Phenomenology of Spiri t . I rans. A. Millei Oxford OUP, 14> / / .
1leidegger, M. In Introduction to Mctapln si i s . I oiklon Yale I lni \ersi t \ Press, |0y)
Poetry. Iunyuayc. Lhouyht. New York: l larpei .V Row, Publishers, P ' / l
l ieiny aiul Lime. Trans. .1.Maei | i iarr ie iV:I Robinson (Klonl l lasi l
Blaekwell , I& 85.
the Onestion ( oncerniny Technoloyy and Other Issays Trans \Y
I ovil l . New York: Harper & Row, 1077.
Held, I) , (ed.) . Polit ical theory today Cambridge: Poli ty Press. I () l ) |
1lorsman, R. Race am! Manifest Pestiny the Oriyins of American Inyto Sa\omsm
Cambridge Mass: Harvard Universi ty Press. I OS I
I Insserl , 1 Lormal and Iransceinlental I oyn Trans. IV ( aims I l ie Hague: Nijl iof f
1060.
Logical Invcst iyations iolimie I I rai ls . I bindlay I ondon Roulledge »V:
Kegan Paul, 1070.
I he ( 'r isis of luropean Sciences and I ranscendenhil Phenomenology In
Introduction to Plienomenological Philosophy Irans. I) Can bvauslon
Northwestern I (diversi ty Press, 1070.
Introduction lo the Logical Invest igations. I l ie Hague Matlini is Nijholl
1075.
The Paris Lectures. Trans. P. Koestenbaii in. Thellugue Marlinns Nijholl ,
1075.
Ideas (ieneral Introduction to Pure Phenomenology I rai ls W (iihson
New York: Humanit ies Press Ine. , l l) /(>
Ideas Pertaimny to a Pure Phenomenology and In a Phenomenoloynal
Philosophy Irans. I Kerslen. I 'he Hague: Martinus Ni |holl Publisher: . P 'K. '
( ieneral Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology Irans I Kerslen Ihe
I lague: Nijholl , 1082
Cartesian Meditations I rans. I) . ( 'a ims. I .ondon Kluwei I
Cartesian Meditations London Kluwei' Academic Press 100')
Jameson, I Postmodernism or the ( ultural I oyn o/ I ate ( 'apital ism I ondon Ver.o
Press, 1001.
10.'
Jung, C. Psychology ami Western Religion. London: Ark paperbacks, 14)88.
Kant, I. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. New York: The Bobs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1950.
Critique of Pure Reason. London: .I.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1940.
Kaelin, E. F. Heidegger 's Being ami Time. Tallahassee: The Florida State University
Press, 1988.
Kamul, P. ed. A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds. New York: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1991.
Kemp, S. & Squires, J. Feminisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
King. A. (ed.) Culture. Globalisation and the World System. London: Maemillan,
1991.
King. I). Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the US Federal Government.
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1995.
Kockelmans, J. Edmund Zinsser/ s Phenomenology. Indiana: Purdue University Press,
West Lafayette, 1994.
Korner, S. Kant. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural ('itizenship: A Liberal theory of Minority Rights.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Lechte, John. Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers. London: Routledgc, 1994.
Leibniz, G. Discourse of Metaphysics. Correspondence with Arnauldand
Monadologv. Trans. M. Ginsberg. London: Allen & Unwin, 1923.
Levinas, E. Totality and Infinity. Trans. A. Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 1969.
Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London: J.M. Dent & Sons
Ltd., 1991.
Lyotard. J. Heidegger and the "jews". Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1990.
The Postmodern Explained to Children. London: Turnaround, 1992.
Marcuse, 11.Five Lectures. Trans. J. Shapiro & S. Weber. Boston: Beacon Press,
1970.
Martin, T. Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus
Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association. Dover Mass:
Majority Press, 1976.
Marx, K. & Engels, F. The Communist Manifesto. England: Penguin Books, 1967.
Massumi, B. A User's Guide to ('apitalism and Schizophrenia. Massachusetts: The
Mil Press, 1993.
May Reinhard. Heidegger 's Hidden Sources. Trans. Graham Parker. London:
Routledge. 1996.
MCCormick, P. & Elliston, F. eds. Husserl: Shorter Works. Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1981.
McNeill. W. & Feldman, K. eds. Continental Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998.
Moran, I). Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge, 2000.
Mosse, G. Towards the Final Solution: A History of European Racism. Maddison:
University of Wisconsin Press. 1985. St. Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin,
1996.
Mulhall, S. Heidegger and Being and Lime. London: Routledge, 1996.
Polt. R. Heidegger: An Introduction. London: UCL Press, 1999.
Porter. R. The Faber Book of Madness. London: Faber & Faber, 1991.
Priest, Stephen. Theories of the Mind. London: Penguin BooksLtd.. 1991.
103
Proctor, R. Racial Hygiene. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1988.
Rapaport, 1L Litudegger and Derrida, Reflections on Time and Language. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
Reynolds, H. Aboriginal Sovereignly: Reflections on Race, State and Nation. St.
Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin. 1996.
Ricouer, P. Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1967.
Robertson, R. 'Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality." in
King A. (ed.) Culture, Globalisation and the World System. London: Macmillan,
1991.
Rosenau, J. Turbulance in World Politics. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990.
Rucker, R. Infinity and the Mind. Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982.
Sim, S. ed. The Icon Critical Dictionary of Postmodern Thought. Cambridge: Icon
Books, 1998.
Singer, P. Ilege 1.Oxford: OUP, 1983.
Suzuki, 1). T. The Field of Zen. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Spinoza, B. Ethics. Trans. A. Boyle. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1989.
Taminiaux, J. Dialectic and Difference. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press
International, Inc. 1990.
lure, K. and Hamilton, C. Black Power and the Politics of Liberation. New York:
Vintage Books, 1992.
Wallerstein, I. 'Patterns and prospectives of the capitalist world economy', in The
Politics of the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1984.
Wallerstein, I. 'The Lessons of the 1980's, in Geopolitics and Geoculture.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Wiggershaus, R. The Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
W i1let. J. The New Sobriety: Art and politics in the Weimar period. Lngland: Thames
& I Iudson Ltd. 1978.
Wolin, R. The Heidegger Controversy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mi l Press,
1993.
Young, M. .Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990.
Young, J. Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997.
JOURNALS
Anderson, W. "Confessions of a Race Traitor: Racism and science are intimately
bound up in Australia's tropical history." Arena Magazine 30
(August/September): 1997.
Biddiss, M. 'Gobineau and the Origins of European Racism' . Race , 7/3. 1996. pp.
256-269.
Fukuyama, I;. 'The End of History?' The National Interest. 16,( Summer): 1989.
Gordon. I). 'The global economy: new ediface or crumbling foundations?'. New Left
Review, no. 168. 1988.
Himmelfarb, G. 'Response to Fukuyama'. The National Interest, No.16. 1989.
1linkson. M. "The Politics of Aboriginally." Arena Magazine 30
(August/September): 1997.
104
Hollinsworth,, D. 'Discourses on Aboriginality and the Politics of Identity in Urban
Australia', Oceania , vol.63, no. 2, (December): 1992.
Ingram, C. "Stifling Reconciliation." Arena Magazine 30 (August/September):
1997.
James, R. "The Political Iconography of Aboriginality." Oceania 63. 1993.
Katona, J."Jabiluka", Arena Magazine, 30, (Aug/Sep): 1997.
Lattas, A. 'Essentialism. Memory and resistance: Aboriginality and the Politics of
Authenticity. ' Oceania , 63, no. 3, (March): 1993.
McDonald. K. "The Other Side of Identity Politics." Arena Magazine 26
(December/January): 1996/7.
Mudrooroo, Atwood. B., Lattas, A., and Beckett. J. "Comments on Hollinsworth',
Oceania , vol. 63, no. 2. 1992.
Sutherland. K. "Review Article: The Mirror of Consciousness." Journal of
Consciousness Studies 5. (2): 1998.
Poole. R. 'Justice or Appropriation? Radical Philosophy 101 (May/June): 2000.
Varikas, E. "The Burden of our Time." Radical Philosophy 92 (Nov/Dec): 1998.
Watson, S. "The New Bergsonism." Radical Philosophy 92 (Nov/Dec): 1998.
INTERNET
Austlag Ltd. austlag@ausflag.com.au
Brentano, F. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. From
http://net.au/~gaffcam/phil/brentano.htm
Bronner. S. Dialectics at a Standstill: A Methodological Inquiry Into The Philosophy
Of Theodor W. Adorno. From
http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/bron2.htm
Cavalier, R. Department of Philosophy / Carnegie Mellon University (Lectures on
Heidegger's Being and Time)
http://www.lcl.emu.edu:80/CAAE/80254/Heidegger/Introductions/Bkgrd.html
Heidegger, M. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From
http://werple.net.au/~gaffcam/phil/heidegger.htm
Husserl. E. Pure Phenomenology, Its Method and Its Field of Investigation Inaugural
Lecture at Freiburg in 1917. From.
http://www.baylor.edu/~Scott_Moore/essays/Husserl.html
One Nation http://www.gwb.com.au/onenation/press/020798.litml
Rosado. C. The Undergirding actor is power: Towards an Understanding of
Prejudice and Racism. From http://www.wotldculture.com.race.htm
Sabbatini. R. Phrenology: The history of brain localization. Ph.D. University of Sao
Paulo. From http://www.epub.org.br/cm/nO 1/frenolog/frenologa.htm
The Rise of Experimental Psychology.
http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/Mind/EpistemologyoM.html
Wundt. W. Outlines of Psychology 1897. From
http://werple.net.au~gaffcam/phil/wundt.htm
105
